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ENERGY EMERGENCIES 
Amy L. Stein 
ABSTRACT—Emergency powers are essential to the proper functioning of 
the government. Emergencies demand swift and decisive action; yet, our 
system of government also values deliberation and procedures. To enable 
such agility in a system fraught with bureaucracy, Congress frequently 
delegates unilateral statutory emergency powers directly to its most nimble 
actor: the President. The powers Congress delegates to the President are vast 
and varied, and often sacrifice procedural requirements in favor of 
expediency. Most scholars and policymakers have come to terms with this 
tradeoff, assuming that the need to respond quickly is outweighed by any 
loss of accountability. 
This Article challenges this long-standing assumption and is skeptical 
of the zero-sum framework that suggests accountability and expediency 
cannot coexist in statutory emergency delegations. Specifically, it develops 
an Executive Delegations Matrix to better evaluate the different delegation 
options, demonstrating that accountability and expediency need not be 
mutually exclusive. This Article then uses emergency energy powers to test 
the viability of the factors favoring unilateral delegations, ultimately finding 
these factors unpersuasive in the energy-emergency context. Instead of the 
common knee-jerk reaction to unilateral presidential control over 
emergencies, this Article finds that Congress can often cultivate a more 
balanced decision-making framework by providing a greater role for expert 
agencies. By challenging the assumptions underlying unilateral presidential 
delegations for energy emergencies, this Article provides a new framework 
for assessing the world of unilateral presidential delegations more broadly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nobody likes an emergency. By definition, it suggests that something 
unexpected or unforeseen has happened.1 There is little room for hesitation. 
The response must be “immediate” and “urgent.”2 To respond effectively to 
an urgent need, Congress often defaults to delegating statutory emergency 
powers directly to the President.3 This allows the President to use her unique 
position in our government to act unshackled by typical procedural 
restrictions that constrain agencies and other branches.4 For instance, the 
 
 1 Merriam Webster defines an emergency as “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the 
resulting state that calls for immediate action” or “an urgent need for assistance or relief.” 
Emergency, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emergency 
[https://perma.cc/YP9U-LN2E]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Amy L. Stein, A Statutory National Security President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183, 1203 (2018); 
Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-
Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1263 (1988) (“The vast majority of the foreign affairs powers the 
President exercises daily are not inherent constitutional powers, but rather, authorities that Congress has 
expressly or impliedly delegated to him by statute.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–
10 (1993) (describing the use of executive orders by different presidents throughout history); Erica 
Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2030–31 (2015) (discussing executive orders 
and their enforceability); Steven Ostrow, Enforcing Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Action 
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President is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its 
attendant rulemaking procedures.5 Thus, the President is not subject to 
Chevron deference from reviewing courts,6 nor a multitude of other 
procedural rules.7 In delegating statutory emergency powers to the President, 
Congress often finds that waiving procedural requirements is a worthwhile 
sacrifice for the sake of assumed benefits like expediency, expertise, 
accountability, and consistency. 
For all its merits, however, this approach is not without consequences. 
Emergency powers are also subject to abuse.8 Without meaningful 
constraints on a direct presidential delegation, a president is free to declare 
questionable emergencies to unlock these statutory powers.9 Even more 
controversial is when a president declares questionable emergencies to 
unlock these powers in direct contradiction of congressional intent.10 
Because emergency powers are so broadly granted and representative 
procedure is so easily abandoned, the inevitable result can involve 
unaccountability and aggrandizement of the President.11 
 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 659 (1987) (“[E]xecutive orders 
have become an important weapon in the arsenal of presidential policymaking.”). 
 5 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in 
sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 6 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (“When a court reviews 
an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.” 
(emphasis added)); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992). 
 7 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7 (discussing congressional procedures of the Legislative Branch, 
including majorities needed to enact legislation). 
 8 For example, consider President Trump’s failed attempt to bail out the coal industry using 
emergency powers. See Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (proposed Sept. 29, 2017) (to 
be codified 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); SHARON JACOBS & ARI PESKOE, ENERGY EMERGENCIES VS. 
MANUFACTURED CRISES: THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO DISRUPT POWER MARKETS 11 (2019), 
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Energy-Emergencies-vs-Manufactured-Crises-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2SM-DWU7] (exploring the potential for “manufactured crises” with 
regard to emergency energy powers). For an example of President Trump’s use of statutory national 
security powers under the Immigration and Nationality Act to deny entry to immigrants, see Exec. Order 
No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017) (titled “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 
Improvements”), and Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (titled “Protecting the 
Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”). 
 9 See Stein, supra note 3, at 1220–44. 
 10 Charlie Savage, Presidents Have Declared Dozens of Emergencies, but None Like Trump’s, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/trump-presidency-national-
emergency.html [https://perma.cc/Q5CC-HEJC] (describing how President Trump redirected funds to the 
border wall in direct contradiction of a congressional denial of such funds). 
 11 Babette E.L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal Agency Emergency 
Powers, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3339, 3348–53 (2013) (providing empirical work on the rise of agencies’ 
use of the “good cause” exception of the Administrative Procedure Act). 
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Given the constitutional and historical deference to presidents on 
matters of national security, Congress’s delegation of statutory emergency 
powers to the President can be seen as an expected extension of her Article 
II powers as Commander in Chief and the nation’s sole protector against 
foreign threats. This might suggest that the President only enjoys such 
unilateral statutory powers when the nation’s national security is threatened. 
After an exhaustive search through the U.S. Code, however, and contrary to 
conventional thinking on the scope of a president’s emergency powers, this 
Article demonstrates that this is not the case. In addition to providing the 
President unilateral powers to act in response to foreign threats, Congress 
has provided the President unilateral emergency powers in another 
unsuspecting area: energy.12  
On one level, this makes sense. Energy emergencies traditionally 
involved oil, a commodity with important international and geopolitical 
implications on a global scale.13 The United States relies on three fossil fuels 
(petroleum, coal, and natural gas) for 80% of its energy needs, much of 
which was historically imported from other countries.14 Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, the first generation of emergency energy powers focused on 
allowing swift responses to shortages of these resources.15 
But on another level, delegating powers to address energy emergencies 
solely to the President stands as an outlier amongst the many military, 
foreign-relations, international-trade, and war powers that Congress has 
 
 12 See infra Appendix A. The focus on energy emergencies in no way suggests that they are the only 
area where Congress has delegated broad emergency powers to the President. See infra Part II and 
Appendix B for a complete list. 
 13 On several occasions, past presidents used the Trade Agreements Expansion Act to regulate oil 
prices and imports in the interest of national security. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 4341, 40 Fed. Reg. 
3965 (Jan. 27, 1975) (“I judge it necessary and consistent with the national security to further discourage 
importation into the United States of petroleum, petroleum products, and related products, in such 
quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security . . . in order to achieve 
the above objectives, I determine that a supplemental fee should be imposed on all imports of petroleum 
and petroleum products . . . .”); Proclamation No. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (Mar. 12, 1959) (“I find and 
declare that adjustments must be made in the imports of crude oil, unfinished oils, and finished products, 
so that such imports will not so threaten to impair the national security . . . .”); see also Anand Toprani, 
A Primer on the Geopolitics of Oil, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/a-primer-on-the-geopolitics-of-oil/ [https://perma.cc/4DSA-HPXU] 
(discussing the interrelated nature of the oil market and the international impacts of national oil policies). 
 14 U.S. Energy Facts Explained: Consumption and Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 7, 
2020) [hereinafter Energy Facts: Consumption and Production], 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/ [https://perma.cc/M6M6-SPJ9]; U.S. Energy 
Facts Explained: Imports and Exports, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 27, 2020), 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/imports-and-exports.php [https://perma.cc/RJB4-
M86H]. 
 15 See infra Part II. 
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provided to the President alone.16 It is particularly jarring when one considers 
that the nature of an energy emergency has shifted over time, as the United 
States has enhanced its supply of domestic fossil fuel resources17 and 
diversified its electricity portfolio to include more renewable resources.18 As 
just one recent example of the changing nature of energy emergencies, the 
2019 novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic resulted in a surplus 
of a fossil fuel resource, with oil prices plunging to negative $37 per barrel—
a 300% drop with global ramifications.19 Notably, as energy surpluses were 
not traditionally cause for an emergency, the President has limited statutory 
authority to address such a scenario.20 Upon closer reflection, future energy 
emergencies are more likely to involve the nation’s electric grid, affected by 
 
 16 Infra Appendix B (Strong President/Weak Agency). 
 17 In 2016, for the fifth consecutive year, the United States remained the top producer of petroleum 
hydrocarbons. Linda Doman, United States Remains the World’s Top Producer of Petroleum and Natural 
Gas Hydrocarbons, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 7, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31532 [https://perma.cc/M9ZS-HM27]. Largely 
attributable to increased drilling activity in both the Permian region and Federal Offshore Gulf of Mexico, 
this trend is expected to continue, as forecasts indicate an expected increase in U.S. petroleum production 
from 15.6 million barrels/day (b/d) in 2017 to 16.7 million b/d in 2018, compared to a projected 
production capacity by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) of 39.9 million b/d 
in 2018. Id.; Matthew French & Jeff Barron, U.S. Crude Oil Production Increases Following Higher 
Drilling Activity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30032 [https://perma.cc/SYR6-8BCY]. An estimated 
264 billion barrels of oil reserves in existing fields, new projects, and recently discovered locations remain 
untapped, surpassing reserve volumes of both Russia and Saudi Arabia. Matt Egan, U.S. Has More 
Untapped Oil than Saudi Arabia or Russia, CNN BUS. (July 5, 2016, 12:04 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/05/investing/us-untapped-oil/index.html?iid=surge-story-summary 
[https://perma.cc/S8XA-FN36]. 
 18 Electricity Explained: Electricity in the United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 20, 2020) 
[hereinafter Electricity Explained], https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricity-in-the-
us.php#:~:text=The%20three%20major%20categories%20of,geothermal%2C%20and%20solar%20 
thermal%20energy [https://perma.cc/3L2D-7Z27]. 
 19 See Catherine Ngai, Olivia Raimonde & Alex Longley, Oil Plunges Below Zero for First Time in 
Unprecedented Wipeout, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 1:59 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-19/oil-drops-to-18-year-low-on-global-demand-
crunch-storage-woes [https://perma.cc/YN3G-PJSC] (stating that oil price per barrel at the close of 
business on April 17 was $18.27 and fell to negative $37.63 three days later). 
 20 See, e.g., Laila Kearney & Timothy Gardner, Exclusive: U.S. Aims to Lease Space in Emergency 
Oil Stockpile, After Buying Plan Canceled - Sources, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2020, 6:56 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-oil-usa-reserve-exclusive/exclusive-us-aims-to-lease-space-
in-emergency-oil-stockpile-after-buying-plan-canceled-sources-idUSKBN21I3NG 
[https://perma.cc/Y8RH-S92B]. But once that reserve runs out, there is no energy emergency authority 
to address such a situation, leaving the Trump Administration with only soft-law strategies such as 
encouraging OPEC+ countries to constrain supply and advocating for states to “fill up every cavity that 
we have in this country.” Remarks by President Trump in Meeting with Energy Sector CEOs, THE WHITE 
HOUSE (Apr. 3, 2020, 3:18 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-meeting-energy-sector-ceos [https://perma.cc/LF8F-JY2B]. 
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natural disasters,21 cybersecurity and physical security weaknesses,22 
infrastructure deficiencies, or operator and regulatory misjudgments.23 Such 
energy emergencies of the future are much more akin to emergencies that 
can occur in other traditionally domestic sectors such as the environmental, 
agriculture, employment, and health-care sectors, where Congress has 
delegated emergency powers to the respective expert agency.24 And while all 
of these sectors, including energy, can have international implications, they 
do not necessarily fit easily into a category of national security threats from 
foreign powers traditionally viewed as being within a president’s sole 
jurisdiction or expertise. 
 
 21 See, e.g., OFF. OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
COMPARING THE IMPACTS OF THE 2005 AND 2008 HURRICANES ON U.S. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 510 
(2009); James Wagner & Frances Robles, Puerto Rico Is Once Again Hit by an Islandwide Blackout, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/us/puerto-rico-power-outage.html 
[https://perma.cc/WC9D-CHT9]; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., ENHANCING THE RESILIENCE 
OF THE NATION’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM 5070 (2017), https://www.nap.edu/read/24836/chapter/5#61 
[https://perma.cc/H9E9-P8VW]. 
 22 See Blake Sobczak, Experts Assess Damage After First Cyberattack on U.S. Grid, E&E NEWS 
(May 6, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060281821 [https://perma.cc/6V9H-DY6A]; 
Christopher Bosch, Securing the Smart Grid: Protecting National Security and Privacy Through 
Mandatory, Enforceable Interoperability Standards, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1349, 136568 (2014); Yi 
Deng & Sandeep Shukla, Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures—A Survey on the Cyber Security Issues 
in the Transmission Subsystem of a Smart Grid, 1 J. CYBER SEC. & MOBILITY 251, 25662 (2012); 
MISSION SUPPORT CTR., IDAHO NAT’L LAB’Y, CYBER THREAT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE 
U.S. ELECTRIC SECTOR 212 (2016); THOMAS F. MCLARTY III & THOMAS J. RIDGE, CTR. FOR THE 
STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY & CONG., SECURING THE U.S. ELECTRICAL GRID 2125 (2014); David Z. 
Bodenheimer, Pulling the Plug on the Nation’s Power Grid: Cyberthreats and Homeland Security 
Challenges, 2 SCITECH LAW. 4, 47 (2006); Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity Policy for the Electricity Sector: 
The First Step to Protecting Our Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
319, 321 (2013). But see Daniel M. Creekman, A Helpless America? An Examination of the Legal Options 
Available to the United States in Response to Varying Types of Cyber-Attacks from China, 17 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 641, 654–55 (2002) (discussing cybersecurity threats to the United States but only 
mentioning energy in passing). 
 23 OFF. OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, 
at 110. See generally TRAVIS FISHER, INST. FOR ENERGY RSCH., ASSESSING EMERGING POLICY 
THREATS TO THE U.S. POWER GRID (2015), https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Threats-to-U.S.-Power-Grid.compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JB7-7N79] 
(assessing various emerging threats to the U.S. power grid). Compare Proclamation No. 4341, 40 Fed. 
Reg. 3965 (Jan. 27, 1975) (focusing on the threat of relying on foreign oil imports), with Exec. Order No. 
13,920, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,595 (May 1, 2020) (focusing on the threat of cyberattacks on the U.S. grid). 
 24 See infra Appendix B. Like environmental, agriculture, employment, and health-care emergencies, 
energy emergencies of the future likely will require specialized expertise and will often be limited to the 
specific areas of the United States. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text; see also infra Section 
III.A.1 (comparing environmental emergencies and energy emergencies). Generally, agencies can act on 
some of these emergency powers independently (Weak President/Strong Agency) and some of them only 
after a presidential emergency declaration (Strong President/Strong Agency). See infra Appendix B. 
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This Article analyzes these emergency energy powers25 to test the 
viability of the factors favoring unilateral presidential delegations—namely, 
expertise, accountability, consistency, and expediency. It challenges the 
long-standing assumption that accountability must be sacrificed for 
expediency in times of emergency. By using emergency energy powers to 
test both the assumptions underlying direct unilateral presidential 
delegations, as well as the feasibility of constraining a president through 
intra-executive checks, this Article challenges the widely held belief that 
emergency responses necessitate unilateral presidential delegations. On the 
contrary, this Article finds that expertise, accountability, consistency, and 
expediency often can be achieved without fostering unilateral presidential 
power. As such, it urges Congress to be more hesitant to cast aside 
procedural and substantive constraints on the President in addressing  
emergencies such as those involving energy. 
Instead of providing the President with unilateral authority, this Article 
argues that the nation would often be better served by including expert 
energy agencies in emergency decisions. Despite popular academic 
contentions that delegations to executive agencies are irrelevant to a 
president’s exercise of power under a unitary executive theory,26 this Article 
demonstrates how a shared delegation to the President and an expert agency 
can result in better decision-making. This Article will further argue that this 
is particularly true in an area such as energy, with both executive (the 
Department of Energy) and independent (the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission) agencies at the President’s disposal. A technical and 
complicated sector such as energy deserves to have expert agencies involved 
in critical emergency decisions, especially when Congress can delegate such 
shared authority in a way that does not unduly hinder a president’s ability to 
act swiftly in times of emergency. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I focuses on Congress’s 
decision to delegate emergency powers directly to the President. It evaluates 
competing risks and rewards of such unilateral delegations to underscore the 
stakes accompanying the choice of delegation. It then develops an Executive 
Delegations Matrix to better evaluate the different Executive Branch 
delegation options, demonstrating that accountability and expediency need 
not be mutually exclusive. Part II then analyzes statutory grants of powers 
that allow energy-emergency determinations to be made, confirming 
Congress’s tendency to delegate directly to the President. It demonstrates the 
 
 25 This research took an inclusive approach to identifying emergency energy powers as described 
infra notes 106109. See infra Appendix A for the energy emergency powers and infra Appendix B for 
a full list of emergency powers. 
 26 See infra notes 31 and accompanying text. 
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broad extent of these powers, as well as assesses the conditions that must be 
met for the delegate to unlock them. The broad discretion Congress provides 
to the President is not a problem in and of itself. But when it is combined 
with a president who is not responsive to the historical context for such 
powers nor to rebukes by the legislature or the Judicial Branch, that broad 
discretion becomes a problem. Our system of government cannot function 
solely on trust. Part III then urges a shift from unilateral presidential powers 
to a more evenhanded sharing of powers within the Executive Branch 
between both the President and an agency. Specifically, it exposes the 
vulnerabilities in the assumptions that support unilateral presidential control 
of energy emergencies, as well as demonstrates how incorporating expert 
agencies into emergency delegations can reestablish some of the checks and 
balances so essential to our democracy. 
I. STATUTORY EMERGENCY POWERS 
Unlike ice cream, emergency powers only come in two flavors: (1) 
constitutional and (2) statutory. And, as with ice cream, these powers can 
function individually or together as a “swirl.” Presidents have frequently 
invoked their constitutional authority under Article II of the Constitution to 
address emergencies, which is a topic of frequent scholarly discussion.27 But 
these constitutional powers are augmented where they are accompanied by a 
more specific grant of statutory authority. Together, this “swirl” has 
frequently been used to support presidential emergency action.28 
This Article concerns these statutory grants of emergency authority. 
More specifically, it focuses on Congress’s all too frequent choice to 
delegate such emergency authority wholly and completely to the President 
alone.29 While such unilateral delegations make sense in a number of 
contexts, particularly those related to national security matters, there are 
many situations where the presidency is not the best place to house this 
power. Although Congress also delegates emergency powers to agencies, 
 
 27 See infra notes 51–54. 
 28 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953) (“[B]y virtue of the authority 
vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States . . . and as President of the United States, 
and deeming such action necessary in the best interests of the national security, it is hereby ordered as 
follows . . . .”); Exec. Order No. 11,157, 29 Fed. Reg. 7973 (Apr. 23, 1971) (“By virtue of the authority 
vested in me by . . . title 37 [of the] United States Code[] and as President of the United States and 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States . . . .”). 
 29 BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., A GUIDE TO EMERGENCY POWERS AND THEIR USE (2019) [hereinafter 
BRENNAN REPORT], https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legislation/Emergency%20Power
s_Printv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF2S-FEVA] (identifying 95 of 136 statutory emergency powers that can 
be used by the President without any restrictions or constraints). 
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states, and sometimes courts,30 this Article focuses on the federal Executive 
Branch, particularly the choice between the President and an agency as the 
delegate of such power to act in times of emergency. 
Administrative law scholars have long debated the question of whether 
it makes a difference if Congress delegates statutory authority to the 
“President” or to an “Administrator.”31 These debates often focus on 
situations where Congress has delegated authority to an executive agency. In 
such situations, much of the scholarly attention has focused on the extent, if 
any, to which an agency can truly exercise this authority independent of the 
President’s will.32 Many scholars argue the irrelevance of this choice, 
positing that presidents are running the show, regardless of whether the 
statutory language actually delegates to the “President” or to an 
“Administrator.”33 Consequently, this line of scholarship focuses on how the 
 
 30 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and 
Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 366, 372–80 (2010) (comparing delegations 
to agencies and courts under Title VII, arguing for “the significance of the choice of delegate,” and 
analyzing four factors that scholars have theorized inform Congress’s choice: “(1) [political alignment 
between the recipient of the authority and the Congress], (2) a desire to avoid blame for unpopular 
decisions, (3) the relative expertise of possible delegates, and (4) the relative flexibility of delegated 
decisionmaking”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 247(d) (stating that “[i]f the Secretary determines, after 
consultation with such public health officials as may be necessary, that . . . disease or disorder presents a 
public health emergency” or “a public health emergency . . . otherwise exists,” then the Secretary may 
take action (emphasis added)); 7 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (noting that if a governor of a state or a county 
committee determines a livestock emergency exists, they may petition the Secretary for assistance); 
42 U.S.C. § 11001 (noting that the governor of each state shall appoint a state emergency response 
commission). 
 31 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law, and Presidential Influence in the 
Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 695 (2014) (arguing “that Chevron deference might 
sometimes be deployed with a welcoming eye to presidential involvement, but only when problems of 
coordination arise”; otherwise, presidential involvement in an interpretation should be given little weight 
if unsupported by legal reasoning); Bijal Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
1961, 2059 (2019) (arguing coordination statutes between agencies passed by Congress should include 
delineation to the President to both protect his role as administrator and ensure better review of his 
actions). 
 32 See Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency Action, 
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2458–61 (2011) (arguing that the choice of delegate may not make much 
difference to agency resistance to presidential supervision and that a statutory delegation to the President, 
rather than to a “Secretary” or “Administrator,” seems best understood as Congress conveying the power 
to the President to choose which Executive Branch official will be primarily responsible for implementing 
that delegation, and delegations to the “Secretary” or “Administrator” as restricting that choice). 
 33 See, e.g., id.; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570–99 (1994); Nathan D. Grundstein, Presidential Power, Administration and 
Administrative Law, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285, 300 (1950); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2319–20 (2001). See generally Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 118 (1994) (discussing both sides of the unitary 
executive argument, but ultimately concluding that “[t]he framers did not constitutionalize presidential 
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courts should interpret statutory grants of power that flow directly to 
agencies as opposed to the President. Then-Professor, now-Justice Elena 
Kagan provoked much of this scholarly debate by suggesting that the words 
of the delegation should not matter.34 She persuasively espoused a unitary 
executive theory, arguing that any statute that grants power to an executive 
agency implicitly grants power to the President, as the head of the Executive 
Branch, to direct that agency.35 This approach triggered strong responses 
from administrative law scholars, who have argued that Congress’s choice 
of delegation language should make a difference.36 Professors Peter Strauss,37 
Kevin Stack,38 Robert Percival,39 and Thomas Sargentich40 have countered 
Justice Kagan’s approach with arguments that we should construe statutory 
delegations, where possible, to increase Executive Branch agency officials’ 
ability to resist presidential control. Although this debate between Justice 
Kagan and Professor Stack continues to periodically rear its head,41 this 
Article instead flips the analysis. Instead of focusing on situations where 
Congress delegated to an agency, it explores situations where Congress 
delegated to the President. And instead of focusing on the difficulties that 
agencies face in resisting presidential influence, it asks whether agencies can 
be empowered to influence presidential decision-making by expressly 
including them in a shared delegation of statutory power.  
To answer this question, this Part first explores the justifications for 
unilateral presidential emergency authority, balancing them against the 
 
control over all that is now considered ‘executive’; they did not believe that the President must have 
plenary power over all we now think of as administration”). 
 34 Kagan, supra note 33, at 2251. 
 35 Id. (“[S]tatutory delegation to an executive agency official . . . usually should be read as allowing 
the President to assert directive authority . . . over the exercise of the delegated discretion.”); see also 
Mendelson, supra note 32, at 2458–59. 
 36 See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 263, 304–10 (2006) [hereinafter Stack, Statutory Powers]. 
 37 See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 696, 759–60 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer] (“[W]here Congress has delegated 
responsibilities to a particular governmental actor it has created, that delegation is a part of the law whose 
faithful execution the President is to assure. Oversight, and not decision, is his responsibility.”); Peter L. 
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 573, 667–68 (1984) (arguing that the tensions that exist between the three branches of government 
should also exist between Congress’s and the President’s role in agency administration, thereby ensuring 
one branch does not have total control). 
 38 See Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 316–23. 
 39 Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency 
Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2533 (2011). 
 40 Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay Critiquing 
Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007). 
 41 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 730 (2016). 
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drawbacks to such choice of delegate. Justifications for unilateral authority 
include presidential expertise in emergencies, political accountability as an 
elected government actor, consistency across the Executive Branch as the 
Commander in Chief, and the ability to act swiftly through executive 
orders.42 But, as I have argued elsewhere, Congress has created serious 
problems for reviewing courts and those seeking to challenge presidential 
emergency determinations through their combination of vague terms, 
undifferentiated deference, and lack of procedural requirements prior to 
unlocking such broad statutory powers.43 As such, this Part then tests these 
competing values against existing delegations of emergency powers. 
Evaluating statutory emergency powers across the entire U.S. Code reveals 
four categories of executive delegations, each with a different mixture of 
presidential and agency authorities. This Article then develops an Executive 
Delegation Matrix to both reflect this taxonomy, as well as the tradeoffs 
associated with each of these formulations. 
A. Advantages of Unilateral Presidential Delegations 
Although Congress is rarely explicit in its reasoning behind its choice 
of delegate, scholars have extensively theorized about the justifications for 
unilateral presidential control.44 Unilateral delegations are those that provide 
the President with sole and absolute authority to make an emergency 
declaration and subsequently use the attendant emergency powers. The 
myriad of justifications can be simplified into four categories, each of which 
is discussed below: (1) expertise; (2) accountability; (3) consistency; and (4) 
expediency. 
1. Expertise  
A first factor driving Congress to provide the President with unilateral 
emergency authority may be expertise.45 When it comes to emergencies, a 
term often synonymous with national security, Congress overwhelmingly 
delegates unilaterally to the President as Commander in Chief.46 This choice 
of delegate often stems from Article II of the Constitution, which establishes 
 
 42 See infra Section I.A.1. 
 43 Stein, supra note 3, at 1197–1220; see also infra Section I.A.2. 
 44 See supra note 39; infra notes 45–47, 49–53, 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 45 William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative 
Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1366 (2018) (citing Strauss, Overseer, supra note 37, at 750–53, for his 
discussion of the expertise-based underpinning of such delegations); Aziz Huq, Structural 
Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887, 91116 (2012) (exploring the nuances 
of presidential reliance on expertise). 
 46 See Stein, supra note 3, at 1203–20. 
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the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces and empowers and 
restrains the President with the Take Care Clause.47 Although there is no 
guarantee that any one elected president is actually an expert in addressing 
national security emergencies, such expertise is implied by her having this 
position.48 Some presidents may have had some previous national security or 
foreign-affairs experience to draw upon,49 but other presidents may be 
encountering these challenges for the first time in their presidential role.50 
Regardless, the Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed this formulation of 
national security exceptionalism in decisions such as Curtiss-Wright, 
providing near absolute deference to the President over foreign affairs and 
national security.51 The Supreme Court referenced the inherent power of the 
President to represent the nation in foreign affairs and to protect security 
interests as legal reason to defer to the judgment of the President.52 Some 
scholars similarly refer to the presidency as the best place in our system of 
government to house powers related to national security and foreign affairs.53 
 
 47 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3. 
 48 Ameziane v. Obama, 699 F.3d 488, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is within the role of the executive 
to acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting national security.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 187–88 (D.C. Cir. 2007))); Gregory S. McNeal, The Pre-NSC 
Origins of National Security Expertise, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1585, 1589 (2012) (“[O]ne can accept either 
that Congress (rightly or wrongly) will oftentimes defer to the President’s functional expertise, or one can 
adopt the view that because of his greater functional expertise the President possesses inherent authority 
to act in matters of national security.”). 
 49 See, e.g., Secretaries of State Who Became President, CNN (Aug. 11, 2016, 11:00 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/11/politics/gallery/secretaries-of-state-who-became-president/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y32D-EV26] (listing nine presidents that previously served as Secretary of State); 
Presidents, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y859-WY5P] (elaborating on past U.S. presidents’ backgrounds). 
 50 See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Donald Trump: Life Before the Presidency, UVA MILLER CTR., 
https://millercenter.org/president/trump/life-presidency [https://perma.cc/4XAE-M6XF] (detailing 
President Trump’s career as a business person before becoming president); Lou Cannon, Ronald Reagan: 
Life Before the Presidency, UVA MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/reagan/life-before-the-
presidency [https://perma.cc/5KXT-CAFM] (detailing President Reagan’s early career as an actor); 
Russell L. Riley, Bill Clinton: Foreign Affairs, UVA MILLER CTR., 
https://millercenter.org/president/clinton/foreign-affairs [https://perma.cc/8BAB-EUTL] (“Bill Clinton 
came into office with relatively little experience in foreign affairs.”). 
 51 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–29 (1936). 
 52 See U.S. CONST. art. II; Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319. 
 53 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive 
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 529 (1999) (“I believe that the Constitution is best read 
to vest the President with primary constitutional authority over the conduct of foreign affairs and the 
protection of national security . . . .”); Heidi Kitrosser, It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone: 
Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1410 (2010) (discussing the argument that 
throughout most of American history, Congress respected presidential exclusivity in foreign affairs or 
national security); Koh, supra note 3, at 1263–64. But see Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security 
Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 267–73 (arguing that judicial responses to exigent national 
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To the extent that many of the historical emergencies involved war, it may 
not be surprising that Congress would delegate emergency powers to the 
President as the wartime expert. 
2. Accountability 
Second, many, including Justice Kagan, argue that presidents are the 
best recipient of authority because they are politically accountable.54 As 
Professor Kathryn Kovacs has noted, “[Justice] Kagan defended presidential 
administration on the grounds that the President is more democratically 
accountable than agencies both because he provides an ‘electoral link 
between the public and the bureaucracy’ and because he ‘enhances 
transparency.’”55 “[Justice] Kagan argued that the President’s national 
constituency makes him more responsive to ‘the preferences of the general 
public, rather than merely parochial interests.’”56 Many scholars agree with 
Justice Kagan that the President is in the best position to design policy 
reflective of the public’s interests as a whole because her elected status 
reflects the majoritarian position of the nation.57 There is also some 
 
security policies are not exceptional but are “thoroughly imbricated in the larger texture of American 
public law”). 
 54 Kagan, supra note 33, at 233132; see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of 
the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 60 (2008) (noting that numerous experts “agree that the political 
responsiveness of bureaucratic policy to the preferences of the national electorate correlates strongly with 
presidential control of the administration”). 
 55 Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 515, 562 (2018) (quoting Kagan, supra note 33, at 2331–32). 
 56 Id. at 564 (citing Kagan, supra note 33, at 2335). 
 57 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal 
Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 190 (1986) (“Agency officials, by contrast, are only indirectly 
accountable . . . . For these reasons, a supervisory role by the President should help ensure that 
discretionary decisions by regulatory agencies are responsive to the public generally.”); Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 508 
(1985) (“Presidents are elected presumably because they share the policy preferences of a majority of 
citizens. It follows that they should be permitted to determine social policy within whatever boundaries 
Congress has established.”); Watts, supra note 41, at 725 (“[P]residential control can help to further 
positive values—namely, political accountability and regulatory coherence in agency decisionmaking.”); 
Stephenson, supra note 54, at 59 (“Scholars with diverse ideological and methodological commitments 
have asserted . . . that bureaucratic policy should track majoritarian values . . . imply[ing] the need for 
presidential control over bureaucratic policymaking, because the president is the institutional actor most 
responsive to the preferences of a national majority.”). But see Sidney A. Shapiro, Rulemaking Inaction 
and the Failure of Administrative Law, 68 DUKE L.J. 1805, 1832–33 (2019) (“Because of the electoral 
college, a nominee can win the presidency and still lose the popular vote, an anomaly that can prevent the 
majority of Americans from holding a president accountable for the president’s deregulatory policies.”); 
Tara Law, These Presidents Won the Electoral College — But Not the Popular Vote, TIME (May 15, 2019, 
4:58 PM), https://time.com/5579161/presidents-elected-electoral-college/ [https://perma.cc/VQA8-
MJKY] (identifying the four presidents in American history—the most recent two being President Donald 
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agreement with Justice Kagan that presidential control enhances 
transparency in policymaking, making it more democratically accountable.58 
As such, unilateral presidential delegations may be explained by the 
President’s political accountability. 
3. Consistency 
Third, others argue that allowing the President sole decision-making 
authority is the best approach for ensuring policy consistency.59 Justice 
Kagan has argued that “[c]entral presidential oversight could identify and 
then eliminate the inconsistencies and redundancies that these intersecting 
delegations introduced into the regulatory process.”60 She further argued that 
the President provides more coherent and less factional leadership than 
Congress, as her broad jurisdiction over the administrative state allows her 
to “synchronize and apply general principles to agency action in a way that 
congressional committees, special interest groups, and bureaucratic experts 
cannot.”61 Other scholars agree that the President is in a unique position to 
coordinate “the sprawling federal bureaucracy,” ensuring both efficiency and 
efficacy, “since [she] is responsible for executing many statutes at once.”62 
Justice Kagan further argued that “presidential administration is effective 
because it lends consistency and dynamism to the process.”63 
Coordination benefits from a centralized decision-maker also can be 
valuable in the case of emergencies, as was seen to be lacking in both the 
uncoordinated response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill emergency that 
leaked 168 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico,64 and the 
 
Trump in 2016 and President George W. Bush in 2000—that won the presidential election but lost the 
popular vote). 
 58 See Kagan, supra note 33, at 2332 (“The Presidency’s unitary power structure, its visibility, and 
its ‘personality’ all render the office peculiarly apt to exercise power in ways that the public can identify 
and evaluate.”); Watts, supra note 41, at 734 (arguing that “when exerted through overt mechanisms like 
published presidential directives and public speeches, presidential control can help to promote political 
accountability and bolster the perceived legitimacy of policy decisions made by unelected agency 
officials”). 
 59 Kagan, supra note 33, at 2340. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 2339, 2349. 
 62 Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1084 (2013); see also 
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 
1173–81 (2012) (describing “some of the well-established coordination instruments that are uniquely 
available to the President, including centralized White House review”). 
 63 Kovacs, supra note 55, at 562 (citing to Kagan, supra note 33, at 2339). 
 64 Despite having substantial unilateral emergency powers that could have provided a more 
coordinated response, the Obama Administration deferred to the state and Coast Guard responses, leading 
to a reliance on outdated emergency management plans, unnecessary delays in responding, a lack of 
resources to address the spill, and a lack of accountability. See generally Memorandum from R.J. Papp, 
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scattershot response to the COVID-19 pandemic that started in 2019.65 
Despite these past failures, some scholars have argued that “[t]he President, 
as commander-in-chief and centralized decision-maker, is best suited to 
direct coordinated action in times of extreme emergency within the domestic 
arena, in exactly the same role that the President assumes in foreign crises.”66 
Ultimately, delegating emergency powers to the President may be justified 
in hopes of a more unified, coordinated, and consistent response to such 
emergencies. 
4. Expediency 
Lastly, arguments supporting unilateral presidential powers often focus 
on the need for expediency, particularly with respect to national security 
matters.67 The prevailing wisdom on emergencies is that the government 
 
Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Final Action Memorandum – Incident Specific Preparedness Review 
(ISPR) Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Mar. 18, 2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=7347 
[https://perma.cc/3979-C3B5] (expounding on the issues that hindered the federal government’s effective 
response to the BP oil spill); Oil Spills Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 26, 2020, 2:09 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/world/oil-spills-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/X5Q4-
TAWC]. 
 65 Despite having substantial unilateral emergency powers that could have provided uniformity, the 
Trump Administration preferred to let the states address the COVID-19 pandemic on an ad hoc basis, 
stating that the federal government was merely “a backup” to the states and even going as far as to say 
that the strategic national stockpile of medical equipment was “not supposed to be state stockpiles that 
they then use.” Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus 
Task Force in Press Briefing, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 3, 2020, 5:48 PM) [hereinafter Remarks by 
President Trump], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-
president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-17/ [https://perma.cc/5EFP-YP82]. 
This lack of uniformity contributed to a counterproductive dynamic where the federal government 
preempted the states for protective gear and medical equipment to address the increasing death toll. 
Christina Jewett & Lauren Weber, Trump Administration Uses Wartime Powers to Be First in Line on 
Medical Supplies, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://khn.org/news/trump-administration-
uses-wartime-powers-to-be-first-in-line-on-medical-supplies-ppe/ [https://perma.cc/U27S-C33H]. As of 
November 12, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had resulted in over 242,787 deaths in the United States. 
Coronavirus Resource Center: U.S. Map, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED. (Nov. 8, 2020), 
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map [https://perma.cc/4PX8-LTUX]. 
 66 Scott R. Tkacz, In Katrina’s Wake: Rethinking the Military’s Role in Domestic Emergencies, 
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 301, 318 (2006) (arguing the delay in response to Hurricane Katrina could 
have been prevented if the President had unilateral emergency powers to deploy federal military 
assistance); see also Megan E. Ball, Note, Blank Checks: An Analysis of Emergency Actions Warranting 
Unilateral Executive Action, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 928 (2018) (arguing agencies should not be 
allowed to act unilaterally in times of emergency and that emergency situations should be addressed by 
the President and Congress as has historically been done to ensure consistency and stability). 
 67 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1676 (2002) 
(“The centralization of authority in the President is particularly crucial in matters of national defense, 
war, and foreign policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and 
mobilize national resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other branch.”); United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The nature of transactions with foreign 
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response cannot be hamstrung by bothersome procedural or substantive 
requirements68 and that the federal executive is in the best position to quickly 
address national emergencies.69 As discussed above, conventional thinking 
supports the view that the executive is the best branch to handle things 
quickly.70 Scholars focus on expediency as an important justification to 
delegate solely to the President, arguing that the presidency is the institution 
most capable of responding with the speed required to be effective.71 This 
rationale applies with significant force to emergency delegations. 
 
nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy 
and dispatch.” (emphasis added)); James E. Baker, Speech, What Process Is Due? The Role of Judging 
in National Security, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1523, 1526 (2015) (noting that the pathologies of national 
security decision-making include secrecy and speed). Contra Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: 
Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673, 684 (1998) (arguing 
expediency is detrimental to foreign policy and that courts should stop being “lulled . . . [by the executive] 
into a collective fantasy about the nature of the foreign threat” in “the name of expediency”). 
 68 Notably, in a few instances, Congress has even waived procedural requirements for agencies acting 
during emergencies. See 42 U.S.C. § 5174(f)(3)(J)(i) (“The Administrator of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency may waive notice and comment rulemaking with respect to rules to carry out this 
section, if the Administrator determines doing so is necessary to expeditiously implement this section, 
and may carry out this section as a pilot program until such regulations are promulgated.”(emphasis 
added)); 41 U.S.C. § 1707(d) (“The [notice-and-comment] requirements of subsections (a) and (b) may 
be waived by the officer authorized to issue a procurement policy, regulation, procedure, or form if urgent 
and compelling circumstances make compliance with the requirements impracticable.” (emphasis 
added)); see also, e.g., Memorandum from Rosemarie Kelley, Dir., & Karin Leff, Acting Dir., Off. of 
Enf’t & Compliance Assurance, Env’t Prot. Agency, to Enf’t Dirs. 4 n.3 (May 3, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-09/documents/updatedguidanceonemergencyauthority 
undersection1431sdwa.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV3B-A73A] (“Administrative and judicial implementation 
of this authority must occur early enough to prevent the potential hazard from materializing.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-1185, at 3536 (1974), reprinted in 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454, 6488)). 
 69 The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has demonstrated that state executive branches can 
sometimes be even more nimble than the federal Executive Branch. Over a month after the first death 
from COVID-19, Washington was the first state to declare a state of emergency on February 29, 2020. 
Proclamation by the Governor No. 20-05, State of Wash., Off. of the Governor (Feb. 29, 2020), 
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/20-05%20Coronavirus%20%28final%29.pdf?utm_med 
ium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/8HML-MQZQ]. Thirteen days later, President 
Trump issued a national emergency after there were over 1,645 people from forty-seven states infected. 
Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 13, 2020) [hereinafter Proclamation Concerning the Novel 
Coronavirus], https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-
emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak [https://perma.cc/7H5J-3Z2S]. 
 70 Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1424 n. 213 (2009) 
(“[B]oth Congress and the judiciary defer to the executive during emergencies because of the executive’s 
institutional advantages in speed, secrecy, and decisiveness.” (quoting ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 16 (2007))). 
 71 See Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 362 
(2010) (noting the relative ease of a president to issue executive orders compared to the legislative process 
incumbent on Congress); Tkacz, supra note 66, at 302 (arguing that, in the wake of Katrina, Congress 
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Most scholars compare speed of the Executive Branch to the Judicial 
and Legislative Branches, often observing that the structural features of the 
presidency renders that office “institutionally best suited to initiate 
government action,” and that the President’s “decision-making processes can 
take on degrees of speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other 
governmental institution can match.”72 Unilateral presidential powers are 
also favored over Congress’s powers when comparing their relative speed of 
decision-making.73 Congress is often plagued with regulatory gridlock, while 
the President is able to use executive orders to more swiftly implement her 
will.74 Scholars have repeatedly noted that “the executive branch can move 
far more quickly than can Congress or the courts.”75 
Comparing the relative expediency of the President versus agencies 
within the Executive Branch yields the same critiques. Agencies are 
traditionally criticized for their bureaucratic burdens and accompanying 
delays.76 As will be discussed in Section III.B.1, agencies are bound by the 
rulemaking and process requirements of the APA,77 in stark contrast to the 
President’s freedom to implement actions quickly through executive 
orders.78 Accordingly, where urgency is the driving force, congressional 
delegation of emergency powers to the President is the rational choice. There 
 
should give the President more flexibility in ordering federal troops because the delays were devasting); 
see also Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. 
L. REV. 1897, 1939 (2015) (“[S]peed is necessary in emergencies, foreign or domestic . . . .”). 
 72 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE 
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 11819 (1990). 
 73 Gilman, supra note 71, at 365. 
 74 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1993) (describing the use of executive orders by different presidents throughout history); Erica Newland, 
Note, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2030–32 (2015) (discussing executive orders and 
their enforceability); Steven Ostrow, Note, Enforcing Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency 
Action Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 659 (1987) (“[E]xecutive 
orders have become an important weapon in the arsenal of presidential policymaking.”). 
 75 Chesney, supra note 70, at 1424 & n.214 (citing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 70, at 5, 18 
(2007)); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and 
Wells, 69 MO. L. REV. 959, 968 (2004) (contrasting executive efficiency with a judiciary that “by design 
acts far more slowly than either political branch”). 
 76 Eric Moorman, “A Greater Sense of Urgency”: EPA’s Emergency Authority Under the SDWA 
and Lessons from Flint, Michigan, 47 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,786, 10,786 (2017) 
(criticizing the EPA’s slow response to the Flint water crisis and urging EPA to “invoke its emergency 
powers earlier and more frequently to effectuate the SDWA’s preventative purpose and protect public 
health”); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1385, 1386–87 (1992). 
 77 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in 
sections of 5 U.S.C.); see also infra Section III.B. But see sources cited supra note 68. 
 78 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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are few other categories more deserving of an expedited response than 
emergencies. Therefore, relying upon some combination of expertise, 
accountability, consistency, and expediency rationales, Congress can 
support its delegations of broad and unilateral powers to the President.79 
B. Perils of Unilateral Presidential Delegations 
Congress’s choice to delegate unilateral authority to the President may 
satisfy the values delineated above, but such delegations also have potential 
negative consequences due to the lack of internal executive agency checks 
and external checks from the judiciary.80 And as pressing as emergencies are, 
there are certain values that should not be sacrificed, even in times of a 
national emergency.81 This Section explores the resulting dilution of checks 
and balances that compromises the transparency and reviewability of these 
presidential decisions. 
1. Uninformed Decision-Making 
A first disadvantage of unilateral presidential delegation is that it allows 
the President to sidestep any input from expert agencies. In most situations, 
it is unlikely that a president would ever act on her emergency powers 
without conferring with her relevant advisors.82 Yet, merely trusting that a 
 
 79 See infra Part II. 
 80 Kovacs, supra note 55, at 566; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Diane A. Desierto & Natalia Volosin, 
Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers Without Checks and Balances in Argentina and the 
Philippines, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 246, 331 (2011) (“As long as US Presidents find ways to act 
unilaterally under the national security umbrella, the US risks taking on some aspect of hyper-
presidentialism.”). 
 81 See CONG. RSCH. SERV., NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS (2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8HM-LQQR] (noting that “the Constitution 
makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency”). But see 
Order on Plaintiff’s Petition for Preliminary Injunction & Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Binford v. 
Sununu, No. 217-2020-CV-00152 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2020), rejecting plaintiff’s motion for 
preliminary injunction to overturn the Governor’s ban on social gatherings under the First Amendment’s 
Freedom of Assembly and Free Exercise Clauses, and Memorandum Order & Opinion at 1, Legacy 
Church v. Kunkel, No. CIV 20-0327-JB-SCY (D.N.M. Apr. 17, 2020), rejecting TRO to overturn the 
Governor’s ban on social gathering to attend Easter mass at church, as two examples of failed challenges 
on religious liberties and First Amendment grounds during the latest COVID-19 pandemic. 
 82 But see, for example, President Trump contradicting his advisors during a COVID-19 press briefing 
by suggesting that ingestion of household disinfectants like Lysol could be a treatment for the 
coronavirus, in direct contravention of his scientific experts, the FDA, the CDC, and the makers of Lysol. 
Remarks by President Trump, supra note 65 (“Right. And then I see the disinfectant, where it knocks it 
out in a minute. One minute. And is there a way we can do something like that, by injection inside or 
almost a cleaning . . . . So it would be interesting to check that.” (emphasis added)); see also Katie Rogers, 
Christine Hauser, Alan Yuhas & Maggie Haberman, Trump’s Suggestion that Disinfectants Could Be 
Used to Treat Coronavirus Prompts Aggressive Pushback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/us/politics/trump-inject-disinfectant-bleach-coronavirus.html 
115:799 (2020) Energy Emergencies 
817 
president will only invoke such powers in true emergencies and confer with 
advisors beforehand is an ineffectual constraint on a president.83 For too long, 
the American public has proceeded under the assumption that presidents 
would only use these emergency powers in the rarest of instances. But 
previous attempts to stretch the meaning of “emergency” caution against 
relying on trust and presidential self-restraint.84 In reality, a president with a 
statutory grant of unilateral authority can invoke these powers without 
conferring with any expert agency. This is particularly odd given that a 
number of emergencies, such as energy emergencies, are highly technical 
and arguably warrant feedback and opinions from agencies with particular 
expertise in the field of the emergency at hand. Agencies are often involved 
in declaring and responding to emergencies, although sometimes their 
response is hamstrung by and dependent on an initial presidential declaration 
of an emergency.85 At the very least, Presidents have often recognized the 
value of soliciting agencies to assist in responding to emergencies.86 Without 
 
[https://perma.cc/4P42-4UTV] (“[T]he Food and Drug Administration warned that hydroxychloroquine 
and chloroquine, two drugs that the president has repeatedly recommended in treating the coronavirus, 
can cause dangerous abnormalities in heart rhythm in coronavirus patients and has resulted in some 
deaths.”); Improper Use of Disinfectants, LYSOL, https://www.lysol.com [https://perma.cc/DW5Q-
BFHM] (“[W]e must be clear that under no circumstance should our disinfectant products be administered 
into the human body (through injection, ingestion or any other route).”). 
 83 See, e.g., Evan Kraft, Opinion, Trump Knows More than the Fed—According to Him, HILL (Oct. 
12, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/411110-trump-knows-more-than-the-fed-
according-to-him [https://perma.cc/JDU7-HNVR]; Daniel W. Drezner, Opinion, Trump Says He Knows 
Everything. So Why Do His Decisions Look So Dumb?, WASH. POST (May 15, 2019, 9:15 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/05/15/trump-says-he-knows-everything-hes-obviously-
wrong/?utm_term=.5456a9bbacbe [https://perma.cc/E95X-CLEF]. 
 84 Exec. Order No. 13,928, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,139, 36,139 (June 11, 2020) (claiming the International 
Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction over war crimes committed in Afghanistan and the prospect of being 
held accountable for such crimes is an “emergency” under the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA) that justifies freezing U.S.-based assets of any foreign ICC personnel who try to exercise 
jurisdiction over U.S. war crimes and anyone who assists them); Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 
4949, 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019) (national emergency diverting funds to build a border wall between the United 
States and Mexico); Exec. Order No. 13,848, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,843 (Sept. 12, 2018) (national emergency 
regarding interference in U.S. election); Exec. Order No. 13,194, 66 Fed. Reg. 7389 (Jan. 18, 2001) 
(national emergency prohibiting the importation of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone). 
 85 See infra Appendix B; Memorandum on Combatting the National Drug Demand and Opioid Crisis, 
82 Fed. Reg. 50,305 (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/31/2017-
23787/combatting-the-national-drug-demand-and-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/A7CF-LYYF] 
(encouraging the Secretary of Health and Human Services to declare a public health emergency regarding 
the opioid crisis); Proclamation No. 4807, 45 Fed. Reg. 80,809 (Dec. 8, 1980) (“The Secretary of 
Agriculture has . . . determined and reported to [President Carter] that a condition exists with respect to 
peanuts which requires emergency treatment . . . .”). 
 86 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Major National Emergency Grant Will Aid 
Commercial Fisherman (Jan. 10, 2002) (describing that Secretary of Labor granted $5.9 million out of 
her discretionary fund to assist in relocating and retraining fisherman and related industry workers as a 
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explicitly requiring consultation with expert agencies, however, Congress is 
essentially using unilateral presidential delegations to empower presidents 
with the ability to make uninformed decisions. 
2. Unbridled Discretion 
Second, the resulting corollary to sidestepping an agency is the 
inapplicability of the APA, meaning no rulemaking requirements or arbitrary 
and capricious review. Although all agencies are subject to the APA, the 
Supreme Court in Franklin v. Massachusetts87 held that the President is not 
considered an agency governed by the APA and accordingly that the APA 
does not apply to presidential action.88 As Professor Evan Criddle has noted, 
the Court recognized that although 
“[t]he President is not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview,” it stressed 
that “he is not explicitly included, either,” and expressed concern that extending 
administrative procedure to presidential action could implicate “separation of 
powers and the unique constitutional position of the President.” In the absence 
of a particularly clear statement from Congress, the Court reasoned that it 
should not construe the APA to limit presidential lawmaking. The Court thus 
construed the APA to categorically exempt presidential lawmaking from the 
ordinary requirements of administrative procedure.89 
 
major part of President Bush’s “Back-To-Work” package); Presidential Exec. Order Amending Exec. 
Order 13,223, 2017 WL 4707724, at *1 (amending a previous executive order to “provide the Secretary 
of Defense additional authority to manage personnel requirements”). 
 87 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992). 
 88 Id. at 801. Accord Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Loc. 200 v. Trump, 419 F. Supp. 3d 612, 619 
(W.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that, “despite clearly knowing that both the President and OPM may issue ‘civil 
service rules and regulations’ in drafting § 1103(b)(1), Congress chose only to require that rules and 
regulations ‘proposed by the Office’ be subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking 
requirements[,]” and finding regulations issued by the President through executive order to not be subject 
to the APA). In the rare occasions where Congress imposes a notice-and-comment requirement on the 
President, they involve long-term plans or policies. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5165c(a), (c) (“The President 
shall provide for public notice and opportunity for comment before adopting any new or modified 
policy . . . of the public assistance program . . . .”); id. § 8451(b) (“[T]he President shall publish in the 
Federal Register a notice and summary of the proposed report, make copies of such report available, and 
accord interested persons an opportunity (of not less than 90 days’ duration) to present written comments; 
and shall make such modifications of such report as he may consider appropriate on the basis of such 
comments.”). 
 89 Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative Lawmaking, 
46 GA. L. REV. 117, 198–99 (2011) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Franklin, 
505 U.S. at 800–01). 
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In the aftermath of Franklin, courts also have determined that the 
President’s actions “are not reviewable for abuse of discretion under the 
APA.”90 
Similarly, scholars have consistently noted the deficits in transparency 
and deliberation when comparing the President and agencies.91 Professor 
Kovacs notes that “the President often makes his decisions in a black box 
with little to no transparency, much less public participation or deliberation” 
and that the “President has no obligation to solicit feedback . . . and no 
obligation to reveal who influenced his decision or what information he 
considered in reaching it.”92 This means the President could invoke many of 
these emergency powers based on little more than a whim or a political 
inclination. Professor Kovacs recognized that even Justice 
Kagan acknowledged this danger but thought that judicial review would provide 
an adequate backstop. [Justice Kagan] contended that Franklin v. 
Massachusetts’ holding that the President is not an “agency” under the APA 
should not apply when the President “step[s] into the shoes of an agency head.” 
Even if that distinction were upheld, however, and enabled some APA suits 
against the President, applying the rulemaking provisions of the APA to the 
President would be another battle.93 
Thus, without the constraints of the APA, a president’s unilateral 
decision-making could suffer from a lack of transparency and deliberation in 
her unbridled discretion. 
3. Limited Judicial Review 
In addition to eliminating a requirement of agency expertise and the 
rulemaking requirements of the APA, unilateral delegations to the President 
also compromise the reviewability of these presidential decisions. This is 
because the Judicial Branch often takes a tentative approach to judicial 
review of the President’s actions, according her great deference, particularly 
where national security is involved.94 This leads to at least two negative 
consequences for external judicial checks on presidential action. 
 
 90 Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d 70, 101 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Franklin, 
505 U.S. at 801); accord Dettling v. United States, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1128–29 (D. Haw. 2013); 
Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 801 F. Supp. 2d 383, 403 (D. Md. 2011), 
aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 91 Gilman, supra note 71, at 362. 
 92 Kovacs, supra note 55, at 563. 
 93 Id. at 566 (footnotes omitted). 
 94 But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (limiting power of 
the President to seize steel mills even in the face of national security concerns). 
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First, the Supreme Court has yet to agree upon the proper level of 
deference for presidential statutory interpretations, as opposed to agency 
statutory interpretations. The Supreme Court’s Chevron doctrine governs 
much of statutory interpretation, providing a two-part test for review of an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute, with significant deference given to the 
agency.95 Whereas the Supreme Court has made clear that Chevron and its 
progeny apply to agency actions, thus providing a standard of review, the 
courts are very unclear about the standard of review for a president’s 
interpretations. The Supreme Court in Franklin v. Massachusetts not only 
declined to apply the traditional Chevron deference to the President’s 
interpretation of a statute—the Court also failed to provide an alternative 
standard of review.96 This leaves a critical void in the jurisprudence, allowing 
inconsistencies to develop in the doctrine.97 
Second, the closer the link to national security, the less likely courts are 
to engage in substantive judicial review. As Professor Stack and I have 
described elsewhere, this leads to broad deference to a president’s statutory 
actions, particularly where there is no agreement on the relevant standard of 
review.98 For instance, in Dalton v. Specter, the Supreme Court noted that 
“longstanding authority holds that such review is not available when the 
statute in question commits the decision to the discretion of the President.”99 
As Professor Kovacs has indicated, even “agencies may ask the President to 
establish policy himself to avoid the burden of rulemaking and to make it 
more difficult for adversaries to challenge the policy in court.”100 
Furthermore, some security statutes specifically waive judicial review 
of presidential emergency powers. Notably, the Defense Production Act 
specifically provides that neither the President’s actions to suspend 
transactions, nor her findings supporting that decision, are “subject to 
judicial review.”101 Congress has waived judicial review of the President’s 
 
 95 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). The Supreme Court 
in Chevron established a two-part test for review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute. Id. At Step 
One, the court asks whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If 
not, the analysis proceeds to Step Two, where the court merely asks “whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. 
 96 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992). 
 97 See Stein, supra note 3, at 1203–18. 
 98 Id. at 1203; Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 267, 299–300. 
 99 511 U.S. 462, 464, 474 (1994) (finding review unavailable where Congress committed “the 
decision to the discretion of the President” under 10 U.S.C. § 2687). 
 100 Kovacs, supra note 55, at 55758 (documenting examples of presidential actions that may have 
been inspired in part by a desire to bypass rulemaking). 
 101 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e) (“[A]ctions of the President under paragraph (1) of subsection (d) and the 
findings of the President under paragraph (4) of subsection (d) shall not be subject to judicial review.”). 
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actions in other contexts, including the ability to finance cleanup of 
contaminated sites,102 to compensate government employees injured by 
hostile action,103 and to designate items as defense items for import or 
export.104 
Judicial review remains the most likely opportunity for providing a 
check on a presidential statutory interpretation, but the lack of a defined 
deference standard—combined with historical deference to the executive on 
national security matters—neutralizes the hope that the judiciary will serve 
as an effective external constraint. 
C. An Executive Delegations Matrix 
Unfortunately, despite these competing justifications for and against 
unilateral presidential authority over emergencies, actual delegations often 
exist in a “black box,” with little in the statute’s text or legislative history to 
conclusively determine the “why” behind Congress’s choice of delegation.105 
Without explicit guidance to better understand the choice of delegation, this 
Article undertakes an exhaustive search of the delegations of emergency 
powers in the U.S. Code to see if there is any discernible pattern that exists 
to explain this choice. The analysis is primarily focused on provisions that 
refer to an “emergency” power for the President or an agency head.106 
 
In a few rare instances, however, Congress has imposed record requirements and an arbitrary and 
capricious standard to the President. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(1)–(2) (“In any judicial action under this chapter, 
judicial review of any issues concerning the adequacy of any response action taken or ordered by the 
President shall be limited to the administrative record. Otherwise applicable principles of administrative 
law shall govern whether any supplemental materials may be considered by the court . . . . In considering 
objections raised in any judicial action under this chapter, the court shall uphold the President’s decision 
in selecting the response action unless the objecting party can demonstrate, on the administrative record, 
that the decision was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law.”). As I argue 
elsewhere, such procedural constraints could be more widely imposed. See Stein, supra note 3, at 1220–
44. 
 102 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(2). 
 103 5 U.S.C. § 5570(d). 
 104 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h). Congress has waived judicial review of agency actions in more limited 
situations, related to discrete actions such as estimates and reports, 2 U.S.C. § 1571, use of alternate 
dispute resolutions, 5 U.S.C. § 581, and the establishment of committees, id. § 570. 
 105 See Lemos, supra note 30, at 36466. 
 106 Our research was inspired by a Brennan Center report’s identification of national security 
provisions. See BRENNAN REPORT, supra note 29. The Brennan Center’s report only focused on the 123 
provisions that can be activated by a president’s declaration of a national emergency under one of the 
four enabling statutes. This does not capture all statutory emergency provisions. For a more 
comprehensive review, we ran an independent search of the U.S. Code titles in Westlaw and used the 
following key word search: (“emergency”) /s (“Secretary” OR “Department” OR “Administrator” OR 
“President”). This keyword search should only generate statutes that include a provision discussing 
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Specifically, these provisions were reviewed for the nature of the agency–
presidential interaction that Congress envisioned, including only those where 
we could determine whether the agency had a primary, shared, or no 
responsibility for emergency powers.107 This culled search resulted in 188 
“emergency” provisions that are provided in Appendix B. 
The data could be divided and analyzed in a number of ways, an 
endeavor that is complicated by the fact that some emergency statutory 
provisions merely “activate” or “unlock” other provisions, some emergency 
provisions are dependent on such emergency declarations, and some 
statutory provisions allow for independent emergency powers.108 Another 
challenge is defining what is meant by unilateral powers. For purposes of 
this analysis, unilateral presidential powers are those where the President has 
sole authority to both activate and implement powers in an emergency. 
Unilateral agency powers, on the other hand, are only classified as such 
where the agency has the sole authority to implement emergency powers and 
they are not dependent on the President to unlock them. 
Similarly complicated, some emergency powers are shared by both the 
President and an agency. For purposes of this Article, any emergency power 
 
emergencies in the same sentence as the President or agency heads. While this search was compared to 
the Brennan Center’s report to ensure those provisions were captured, it resulted in additional provisions. 
To ensure we captured as many energy provisions as possible, we then ran additional searches specific to 
the two primary energy agencies, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the 
Department of Energy (DOE), using the keyword search: (“emergency”) /p (“Secretary of Energy” OR 
“Department of Energy” OR “Federal Energy Regulatory Commission” OR “FERC” OR “DOE”). See 
infra Appendix B for the results of this search with energy provisions highlighted in grey. 
 107 Because of our focus on the interaction between the President and an agency to respond to an 
emergency (as compared to preparing or recovering from an emergency), statutes were disregarded in our 
search if they: (1) did not explicitly state which executive entity, the President or the agency, had the 
power to declare an emergency; (2) did not specify which entity could exercise the emergency power; (3) 
were “passive” emergency statutes (for example, statutes that automatically waive provisions in an 
emergency); (4) were no longer good law; or (5) only discussed the establishment of emergency plans. 
This resulted in a few less provisions than were included in the Brennan Center’s report. Those left out 
from the Brennan Center’s report most often fell under the first and third caveats, or the emergency 
declaration power could only be exercised by Congress. We only considered Congress’s delegation, not 
subsequent delegations. We did not include the temporary emergency provisions contained in the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act that allows agency administrators to take 
some temporary action in response to the pandemic and the President’s declaration of a national 
emergency. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 9008. Notably, this does not cover statutory provisions that only contain 
the word “emergency” (e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5159) nor regulations that 
provide for emergency powers (e.g., 44 C.F.R. § 10.13). 
 108 Some statutory emergency provisions are only activated after the President or relevant Secretary 
has declared an “emergency” under one of four statutes: the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601–51, the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, id. §§ 5121–5208, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2318(a)(1). These four provisions are listed at the end of Appendix B. 
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that could not always be implemented unilaterally was classified as a “shared 
power.” That means that shared powers come in many varieties, including 
joint-consent requirements and consultation requirements. Furthermore, 
shared powers often involve a sequential ordering of authority, with an 
agency often being empowered to act only after a presidential declaration of 
an emergency. 
It should be noted that Appendix B contains the citations but not the 
text or full analysis for some additional provisions. Independent research 
identified some emergency provisions that were not captured by the initial 
“emergency” search because Congress used the term “national security” or 
“imminent and substantial endangerment” instead of “emergency” to justify 
the powers. The search was expanded to include these provisions,109 resulting 
in an additional 185 provisions and bringing the grand total to 373 
emergency provisions in the U.S. Code that address federal agency or 
presidential powers.110 Congress’s diversity of approaches to delegating such 
emergency powers resulted in four categories—119 that provide unilateral 
power to the President, 163 that provide unilateral power to an agency, 80 
that provide for shared powers, and 11 that provide emergency authority to 
a nonfederal entity or limit federal executive action. 
Numbers do not tell the whole story, however. Although this may sound 
like Congress delegates more authority to agencies than to the President, the 
overwhelming majority of substantive powers lie with the President and the 
overwhelming majority of ministerial powers lie with an agency.111 
Examples will be discussed below, but to provide a flavor, the President is 
allowed to unilaterally take control of private facilities, prohibit transactions, 
and affect liberties, while agencies are allowed to address employment 
issues, transfers of resources, records, funding, and grant waivers and 
exemptions to their regulations. 
 
 109 To be more comprehensive, we ran two additional searches using the following key word 
searches: (“national security”) /s (“Secretary” OR “Department” OR “Administrator” OR “President”) 
and (“imminent and substantial endangerment”) /s (“Secretary” OR “Department” OR “Administrator” 
OR “President”). If emergency powers exist that do not use the words “emergency,” “national security,” 
or “imminent and substantial endangerment” in the text of the provision, it would not have been captured 
by this search. This process could proceed indefinitely as there are numerous ways that Congress can 
provide a president power to deal with an emergency without using the search terms identified. See, for 
example, The Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 252, which provides the President the power to call federal 
military to service “as he considers necessary to enforce” federal laws “to suppress” a rebellion. Most 
would agree that this provision qualifies as an emergency provision, but it is not captured in any of our 
searches. See infra Appendix B for the citations that resulted from these additional searches. 
 110 The “national security” and “imminent” provisions were sorted into the four quadrants identified 
in Appendix B. The text of those relevant to energy are included in Appendix A. 
 111 See infra Sections I.C.1–I.C.2. 
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This Section deconstructs Congress’s options for delegating emergency 
executive powers to either the President, an agency, or some mixture of the 
two, resulting in four possible combinations of presidential/agency 
powers:112 
 Strong President/Weak Agency (unilateral presidential 
authority) 
 Weak President/Strong Agency (unilateral agency authority) 
 Weak President/Weak Agency (nonexecutive authority) 
 Strong President/Strong Agency (shared executive authority) 
 
The labels of “strong” and “weak” refer to the literal language of the 
statute, regardless of whether that entity actually exerts this strength or 
weakness. Rather, a strong label reflects the power to declare or act upon a 
declared emergency and a weak label reflects no such power. Each 
combination assumes certain tradeoffs related to the costs and benefits of 
presidential and agency powers, and examples of actual statutory provisions 
for each of the four combinations are provided below.  
1. Strong President/Weak Agency (Unilateral Presidential) 
Congress often favors the Strong President/Weak Agency combination 
when delegating substantive emergency powers. 119 of the 373 total 
emergency powers we found provided unilateral power to the President 
without any required input from expert agencies.113 Such Strong 
President/Weak Agency delegations allow for expedited responses but suffer 
from the short-term accountability problems that result from a lack of checks 
and balances and judicial review.114 
Not surprisingly, these emergency powers are often prompted by 
national security concerns. Based on our research,115 we found that almost 
 
 112 Kevin M. Stack, The Priority of Statutory Interpreters Within the Executive Branch: The 
President, the Agency, and Congress’ Choice of Delegate, 31 ADMIN. & REGUL. L. NEWS 9, 9–10 (2006) 
(building upon Professor Stack’s division of the world of statutory delegations into three distinct 
categories: (1) mixed agency–President delegations that provide power to the agency with some form of 
presidential consultation; (2) simple delegations that provide power solely to an agency; and (3) 
presidential delegations that provide power solely to the President). 
 113 See infra Appendix B. 
 114 See supra Sections I.A–I.B (discussing the pros and cons of unilateral presidential delegations). 
 115 For our research method, see supra notes 106–109. 
115:799 (2020) Energy Emergencies 
825 
all116 of the emergency provisions in Title 10 (Armed Forces),117 Title 22 
(Foreign Relations and Intercourse),118 and Title 50 (War and National 
Defense)119 regarded national security, were dependent on an emergency 
declaration from the President, and delegated the subsequent emergency 
powers to the President. Most importantly, these powers are often 
exceptionally broad with far-reaching effects. For example, Congress has 
provided that “[w]henever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or 
of any class of aliens . . . would be detrimental to the interests of the United 
States, he may [impose] . . . any restrictions he may deem to be 
appropriate,”120 and that “[i]n light of the potential for terrorist use of 
weapons of mass destruction against the United States, the President shall 
take immediate action.”121 Although these national security delegations could 
be justified by the President’s Article II powers as Commander in Chief,122 
this rationale does not justify other areas where the President enjoys absolute 
unilateral emergency powers. As will be discussed below in Part III, 
although Congress provides the President with unilateral powers to address 
a few isolated emergencies in areas such as agriculture,123 transportation,124 
 
 116 There were some exceptions for minor tasks. See 10 U.S.C. § 1491(e) (Secretary of Defense may 
waive any requirements with respect to funeral honors for veterans); 22 U.S.C. § 2703 (Secretary may 
establish and maintain emergency commissary or mess services in places abroad where, in the judgment 
of the Secretary, such services are necessary). 
 117 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 12006(a) (the President may suspend the operation of statutes governing 
the authorized strengths and distribution of reserve officers in an active status in the armed forces); id. 
§ 123b (the President may waive statutory restrictions on using Department of Defense funding); id. 
§ 712(a)(3) (the President may detail members of the armed forces to assist any country that he considers 
it advisable to assist in the interest of national defense); id. § 603 (the President may temporarily appoint 
any qualified person to any officer grade). 
 118 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2318(a)(1) (the President can reduce size of military if he deems it 
necessary); id. § 4103 (the President may suspend any provision of this subchapter with respect to any 
post, bureau, office, or activity of the Department, if the President determines that the suspension is 
necessary in the interest of national security because of an emergency); id. § 8910 (the President may 
block all transactions in all property and interests in property of a person). 
 119 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1515 (the President may suspend the operation of provisions regulating the 
storage, transportation, disposal, procurement, handling, and testing of chemical and biological weapons, 
including the prohibition on testing such weapons on human subjects); id. § 4560(e) (the President may 
provide for the establishment and training of a “nucleus executive reserve” for employment in executive 
positions in government). 
 120 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). 
 121 50 U.S.C. § 2311. 
 122 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 123 7 U.S.C. § 5712(c) (“[T]he President may prohibit or curtail the export of any agricultural 
commodity during a period for which the President has declared a national emergency . . . .”). 
 124 49 U.S.C. § 44908(b) (“The President may waive this subsection if the President decides, and 
reports to Congress, that the waiver is required because of national security interests or a humanitarian 
emergency.”). 
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labor,125 and telecommunications,126 they pale in comparison to the surprising 
amount of unilateral power provided to the President to address energy 
emergencies.127 
2. Weak President/Strong Agency (Unilateral Agency) 
To counteract this unilateral presidential power, Congress sometimes 
delegates emergency powers to an agency without requiring any direct input 
from the President.128 Of the 373 total emergency powers we found, 163  gave 
almost unilateral power to an agency to act in times of an emergency.129 Such 
Weak President/Strong Agency delegations allow for more involvement of 
expertise, but suffer from a more bureaucratic path that may limit 
expediency. 
Emergency powers in this quadrant are often highly specific and 
technical and use the agency’s expertise in the area. Our research found that 
the most prominent areas where agencies have strong delegation and 
emergency powers were in Title 21 (Food and Drugs) and Title 16 
(Conservation).130 Most notably, Congress has provided the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services with the sole authority to determine that a 
public-health emergency exists,131 a power that Secretary Azar used to 
address the COVID-19 pandemic weeks before President Trump declared a 
 
 125 29 U.S.C. § 176 (“Whenever in the opinion of the President of the United States, a threatened or 
actual strike or lockout affecting an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in trade, 
commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication . . . imperil the national health or 
safety . . . .”); see also 46 U.S.C. § 8103(h)(1)–(2) (permitting the President to suspend citizenship and 
nationality requirements for officers and seamen on documented U.S. vessels during a proclaimed 
national emergency or “when the needs of commerce require”). 
 126 47 U.S.C. § 606(c) (stating that the President may, if he deems it necessary in the interest of 
national security or defense, suspend or amend regulations applicable to stations or devices capable of 
emitting electromagnetic radiations, etc.). 
 127 See infra Appendix A. 
 128 See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-
Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 1005 (2001) (“The confirmation process often is used by members 
of the Senate to obtain assurances from prospective agency heads that they will implement the authorities 
entrusted to them with some degree of independence from the president’s political preferences.”); Stack, 
Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 268 (arguing that “grants of authority to agency officials alone, absent 
such conditions, do not authorize the President to act or to bind the discretion of lower-level officials,” 
but instead that “the statutory grants of authority to an official (alone) should be read as vesting the official 
with an independent duty and discretion, not a legal duty to the President”). 
 129 See infra Appendix B. 
 130 See infra Appendix B (Weak President/Strong Agency) and infra Section III.A.I for a discussion 
of the environmental and food-and-drug emergency statutes. 
 131 Public Health Service Act § 319, 42 U.S.C. § 247d. 
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national emergency.132 Among other delegations to agency experts in 
housing and banking,133 Congress also has provided the Secretary of 
Agriculture with sole authority to “undertake emergency [watershed 
protection] measures . . . as the Secretary deems necessary to safeguard lives 
and property from floods”134 and the Secretary of Interior with the power to 
“determine[] that an emergency situation exists . . . to assure the continued 
viability of a particular fish or wildlife population.”135 
3. Weak President/Weak Agency (Nonexecutive) 
The Weak President/Weak Agency delegations reflect the worst of both 
worlds with respect to a federal response. This would involve emergencies 
over which the federal executive has no control. Fortunately, such Weak 
President/Weak Agency delegations are generally only theoretical, as 
delegations that did not provide the federal Executive Branch with 
emergency authority would not be effective in responding to national 
emergencies. Where both presidential and agency Executive Branch 
delegations are weak or nonexistent, Congress tends to choose to 
alternatively delegate outside of the Executive Branch to courts or states.136 
Our search resulted in only eleven provisions that fit this category, all of 
which provide a nonexecutive entity, such as a state governor, with 
emergency authority.137 Such emergency delegations have proven useful, 
however, in responding to emergencies that are isolated to one state or 
emergencies relating specifically to state law issues. For instance, Congress 
has delegated power to the governor of a state to declare an emergency 
related to transportation and power plants.138 
 
 132 See Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/TDL2-NHH6]; Proclamation Concerning the Novel Coronavirus, supra note 69. 
 133 See infra Appendix A. 
 134 16 U.S.C. § 2203. 
 135 Id. § 3126. Additionally, although it is only a plan for an emergency (and so not included in 
Appendix A), Congress also requires the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy to 
“recommend a Federal agency or agencies to be responsible for . . . protecting the United States from a 
near-Earth object that is expected to collide with Earth.” 51 U.S.C. § 71103(2)(A). 
 136 See Lemos, supra note 30, at 370–73 (comparing delegation to courts and agencies); see also 
33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (stating that while the Administrator determines whether any pollution presents an 
“imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons,” the district court has the final say in 
deciding whether an injunction should be issued to stop the pollution). 
 137 See infra Appendix B (Weak President/Weak Agency). 
 138 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(1) (“Upon application by the owner or operator of a fuel burning 
stationary source . . . the Governor of the State in which such source is located may petition the President 
to determine that a national or regional energy emergency exists . . . .” (emphasis added)); 49 U.S.C. 
§ 5324(a)(2) (stating that emergency powers relating to public transportation are unlocked when “the 
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4. Strong President/Strong Agency (Shared Executive) 
That leaves the Strong President/Strong Agency combination as the 
theoretical sweet spot of emergency delegation tradeoffs. Such delegations 
may require some more bureaucratic hoops than a unilateral delegation to 
the President, but the inclusion of an expert agency can lead to an enhanced 
outcome in terms of a more informed judgment, a more accountable 
decision-making process, and an avenue for judicial review.139 Our research 
resulted in eighty of these shared delegations, sixty-three of which were 
analyzed as “emergency” provisions that were categorized for the method of 
shared power. The bulk of these shared emergency delegations (44/63) 
reflect an agency authorized to implement authority only after a president 
has activated it. In many ways, these provisions could still be characterized 
as unilateral presidential authority because the agency cannot act without 
approval of the President. But there are also several (11/63) emergency 
provisions that can be activated by the agency or the President.140 Although 
this places an agency on more of an equal footing with the President, because 
either entity can still act unilaterally, neither can provide a check on the other. 
One approach to this dilemma could be to develop shared executive 
frameworks that impose something more akin to joint consent, requiring 
each entity (the President and the agency) to make its own emergency 
declaration before emergency powers are unlocked under the statute, as 
Congress did in a public-health statute.141 While providing a useful intra-
executive check, the trick here is to formulate a statutory formulation that 
requires a president to take an expert agency’s findings into account, but not 
 
Governor of a State has declared an emergency and the Secretary has concurred; or . . . the President has 
declared a major disaster under section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act” (citation omitted)). 
 139 See supra Sections I.A–I.B. Delegations to agencies do not necessarily mean more procedural 
requirements, as Congress has occasionally waived notice-and-comment requirements for an agency. See, 
e.g., sources cited supra note 139. 
 140 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1785 (allowing either a presidential or Health and Human Services 
emergency to activate the powers of the Secretary to furnish medical care to those affected by the 
emergency); 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-83 (allowing the same alternative declaration by the President or the 
Secretary to declare an emergency and stating that “[t]he term ‘emergency period’ means the period in 
which there exists . . . an emergency or disaster declared by the President pursuant to the National 
Emergencies Act or the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act; or . . . a public 
health emergency declared by the Secretary” (emphasis added)). 
 141 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5(g)(1) (“[A]n ‘emergency period’ is the period during which, there 
exists . . . an emergency or disaster declared by the President pursuant to the National Emergencies Act 
or the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act; and . . . a public health 
emergency declared by the Secretary . . . .”(emphasis added) (citations omitted)); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) 
(defining an emergency period as “such emergency period as the President of the United States by 
proclamation may prescribe”). 
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allow an agency to effectively veto or hold up a declaration or 
implementation of needed emergency powers. 
This formulation could result in slower responses, however, suggesting 
another model may be found in the provisions that require the President and 
the agency to consult with one another before acting, as Congress did in two 
key provisions. In the first provision, Congress provided that “[u]pon the 
declaration by the President of a disaster in an insular area, the President, 
acting through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, shall assess, in cooperation with the Secretary and chief executive 
of such insular area.”142 In the second provision, Congress provided that 
“[w]henever the President after consultation with and receiving advice from 
the National Security Resources Board determines that it is in the interest of 
the national security for the Government to obtain prompt delivery of any 
articles or materials . . . he is authorized, through the head of any 
Government agency . . . [to] order for such quantity . . . the President deems 
appropriate.”143 Although few shared powers reflect more of this true 
partnership model between the President and an agency head, under this true 
sweet-spot model, the risk of rash unilateral actions is extinguished while 
expertise, accountability, and judicial review are maintained. Where 
appropriate, Congress could even waive certain procedural requirements that 
would otherwise apply to the agency in exchange for the intra-executive 
check that would occur. This combination is explored in more detail in Part 
III. 
To help visualize these four combinations, I developed an Executive 
Delegations Matrix, as well as highlighted a few representative examples for 





 142 42 U.S.C. § 5204b(a) (emphasis added). 
 143 50 U.S.C. § 3816(a) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This stronger language may make it 
more difficult for the President to comply with the letter of the consultation requirement while 
nevertheless ignoring the advice of their expert agencies. 
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II. PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY ENERGY STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Scholars have evaluated general emergency powers in a number of 
contexts, including the power of states to act in times of crisis,144 the 
suspension of constitutional constraints on government action,145 
administrative law adjustments in response to emergencies,146 small 
emergencies,147 accommodating emergencies,148 an emergency 
constitution,149 the check and balances at work on a president’s general 
 
 144 Jim Rossi, State Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237, 241–57 (2006). 
 145 Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts: The Case 
Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 183–87 (2020). 
 146 Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096–97 
(2009). 
 147 Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 844–45 (2006). 
 148 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 609–
10 (2003). 
 149 Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1030–31 (2004) (arguing 
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emergency powers in times of crisis,150 and empirical work documenting the 
rise of federal emergency power and the associated tradeoffs.151 One category 
of statutory emergency powers that is often overlooked, however, is 
emergency energy powers.152 Given the fact that future energy emergencies 
are likely to involve the electric grid, this analysis drills down into 
emergency energy powers related to the electric grid and refers to them as 
“emergency grid powers.” As seen in Appendix A, even though Congress 
has provided the majority of domestic energy emergency powers to expert 
agencies, it has delegated substantive emergency grid powers to the 
President, placing them squarely in the Strong President/Weak Agency 
classification generally reserved for foreign affairs. In fact, almost 50% of 
all the unilateral emergency grid powers are provided to the President while 
only 15% of unilateral emergency grid powers are provided to an agency.153 
Therefore, this Part identifies the primary emergency energy statutory 
provisions, analyzing the extent of these powers, what is required to unlock 
these powers, and their past uses. Some of these powers stem from 
generalized statutes that are broad enough to encompass energy emergencies, 
which I have labeled “general presidential emergency energy powers,” since 
all of the general provisions give powers unilaterally to the President. Other 
emergency energy powers stem from specific energy statutes, which I have 
labeled “specific presidential emergency energy powers.” These forty-two 
emergency energy provisions are in Appendix A.154 
 
 150 See generally Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, The Bound Executive: Emergency Powers During 
the Pandemic (Univ. of Chi., Pub. L. Working Paper No. 757, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3608974 
[https://perma.cc/XDP4-Q8P7]; Joshua L. Friedman, Emergency Powers of the Executive: The 
President’s Authority When All Hell Breaks Loose, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 265 (2012) (discussing the 
President’s general emergency powers). 
 151 Boliek, supra note 11, at 3349–71; see also Ball, supra note 66, at 912. 
 152 The search for emergency energy provisions did not include those statutory provisions that 
addressed emergency planning. Instead, it only included provisions about responding to an actual 
emergency. See supra notes 107–109 for a description of the process for identifying these provisions. 
 153 See infra Appendix A. 
 154 Notably, this analysis does not include the War Labor Dispute Act, which Congress enacted in 
1943 (and repealed in 1947) to provide presidents with statutory authorization to seize businesses or 
activities stalled by labor controversies. Ludwig Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 60 HARV. 
L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1947). These explicit statutory authorities are part of what distinguished President 
Truman’s attempted seizure of the steel industry in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 586–87 (1952), which limited the power of the President to seize steel mills—even in the face of 
national security concerns—in the absence of explicit statutory authority. Relevant to energy, this 
emergency power was used three times. On May 1, 1943, President Roosevelt seized the soft-coal mines 
after 500,000 miners went on strike. Exec. Order No. 9340, 8 Fed. Reg. 5695 (May 1, 1943); Peter Kihss, 
Seizure of Mines, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1978, at A16. On May 3, 1945, President Truman ordered the 
Secretary of Interior to seize the anthracite coal mines. Exec. Order No. 9548, 10 Fed. Reg. 5025 (May 
3, 1945) (“[B]y virtue of the power and authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United 
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A. General Presidential Emergency Energy Powers 
Included among the broad delegations in generalized statutes that 
Congress has made to the President in the name of national security,155 
Congress has also delegated substantial authority to the President to ensure 
sufficient domestic supplies of critical resources, including energy. Two 
such statutes that contemplate unilateral control over energy resources are 
discussed here: (1) the Defense Production Act (DPA),156 and (2) the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).157 The presidential 
powers under the DPA can be used upon the requisite conditions below, but 
the powers under the IEEPA can only be activated upon a national 
emergency declaration.158 
1. The Defense Production Act 
In 1950, Congress enacted the DPA to ensure the security of the United 
States by supporting “the vitality of the domestic industrial base.”159 
Although it has been invoked by many administrations for various reasons,160 
including addressing the supply of personal protective equipment during the 
recent COVID-19 pandemic,161 it contains four key provisions that grant the 
President unilateral authority to prioritize contracts and orders in times of an 
energy emergency. The first three are found in § 101 and provide for the 
President to prioritize contracts. Section 101(a)(1) authorizes the President 
to “require that performance under contracts or orders . . . which he deems 
necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense . . . take priority.”162 
 
States, including Section 9 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 892) as amended 
by the War Labor Disputes Act (57 Stat. 163) . . . .”). And on May 21, 1946, he ordered seizure of the 
bituminous mines to end a forty-day strike. Exec. Order No. 9728, 11 Fed. Reg. 5593 (May 21, 1946); 
Kihss, supra, at A16. The subsequent Labor Management Relations Act does not provide any similar 
seizure authority for a president. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 141. See also Teller, supra, at 1017. 
 155 See generally BRENNAN REPORT, supra note 29, at 1. See also Stein, supra note 3, at 1193–95. 
 156 50 U.S.C. § 4501. 
 157 Id. §§ 1701–06. 
 158 See id. § 1701(a) (“Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may be 
exercised . . . if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”). 
 159 Id. § 4502(a)(2). 
 160 See Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Construction and Application of the Defense Production Act of 
1950, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 2061 et seq., and Its Regulations, 8 A.L.R. FED. 3D, § 5 (2016) (detailing cases 
challenging actions taken under the Defense Production Act); CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE DEFENSE 
PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950, at Summary (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43767.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SX65-38KB]. 
 161 Memorandum on Order Under the Defense Production Act Regarding 3M Company, THE WHITE 
HOUSE (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-order-defense-
production-act-regarding-3m-company/ [https://perma.cc/28X3-KZJG]. 
 162 50 U.S.C. § 4511(a)(1). 
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The DPA defines the “national defense” as “programs for military and 
energy production or construction, military or critical infrastructure 
assistance to any foreign nation, homeland security, stockpiling, space, and 
any directly related activity,” meaning the President could use this authority 
to promote energy production or construction without any reference to 
foreign nations, war, or typical national security areas.163 Section 101(a)(2) 
then authorizes the President “to allocate materials, services, and facilities in 
such manner, upon such conditions, and to such extent as he shall deem 
necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense.”164 Congress 
prohibits such reallocations of materials in the civilian market, unless there 
is no other alternative to preserve the national defense.165 Lastly, § 101(c) 
authorizes the President to allocate and prioritize contracts relating to 
materials, equipment, and services to maximize domestic energy supplies in 
certain circumstances.166 
Although Congress made this unilateral delegation to the President, it 
also provided that the President could delegate such powers to the relevant 
agency.167 In 1975, the President did just that and delegated this authority to 
the Department of Energy (DOE).168 Since then, the agency has used this 
emergency authority for energy issues only a few times. First, the DOE used 
the DPA § 101(c) authority in 1975 during the construction of the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline to help those building the Pipeline obtain materials on a 
priority basis.169 Second, the DOE used the DPA in 2001 “to ensure that 
 
 163 Id. § 4552(14) (emphasis added). 
 164 Id. § 4511(a)(2). 
 165 Id. § 4511(b). 
 166 Id. § 4511(c). 
 167 Id. 
 168 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 160, at Summary (“The authorities of the DPA are generally 
afforded to the President in the statute. The President, in turn, has delegated these authorities to 
department and agency heads in Executive Order 13603, National Defense Resource Preparedness, 
issued in 2012.”). Functions of the President under the Defense Production Act of 1950  relating to 
production, conservation, use, control, distribution, and allocation of energy, were delegated to Secretary 
of Energy. See Exec. Order No. 11,790, 39 Fed. Reg. 23,185 (June 25, 1974). This information is also set 
out as a note under § 761 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade. 
 169 JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 4 (citing COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: TRANS-ALASKA OIL PIPELINE—PROGRESS OF 
CONSTRUCTION THROUGH NOVEMBER 1975, at 2324 (1976)); see also Trans-Alaska Pipeline Priorities 
Assistance for Construction, 39 Fed. Reg. 34,608 (Sept. 23, 1974); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Priorities 
Assistance for Construction, 40 Fed. Reg. at 26–27 (Dec. 30, 1974); id. at 5409; id. at 19,238; Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Priorities Assistance for Construction, 41 Fed. Reg. 44,476–77 (Oct. 4, 1976); id. at 
53,391. 
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emergency supplies of natural gas continued to flow to California utilities, 
helping to avoid threatened electrical blackouts.”170 
The last DPA emergency provision, § 721, also known as the “Exon-
Florio Amendment,” relates to the review of existing contracts and 
authorizes the President to “suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that 
threatens to impair the national security of the United States.”171 The 
President has a certain time limit within which to take such action172 and 
Congress only allows the President to take such action if she makes two 
findings: (1) credible evidence that leads the President to believe that a 
foreign person’s investment “threatens to impair the national security”; and 
(2) other laws “do not, in the judgment of the President, provide adequate 
and appropriate authority for the President to protect the national security.”173 
Congress, furthermore, demands that the President consider eleven listed 
factors in making such findings, including “the potential national security-
related effects on United States critical infrastructure, including major 
energy assets” and the “long-term projection of United States requirements 
for sources of energy and other critical resources and material.”174 The DPA 
further created an Executive Branch committee, the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), chaired by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, to review such transactions and submit their recommendations to 
the President.175 
 
 170 CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 160, at 9 (citing The California Energy Crisis and Use of the 
Defense Production Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 107th Cong. (2001) 
(DOE ordered natural gas sellers to keep supplying utility Pacific Gas & Electric as it neared insolvency 
during the state’s energy crisis). President Obama also invoked it to assist the Navy’s Great Green 
Fleet of biofuel-powered ships in 2012. See Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: 
Obama Administration Announces Additional Steps to Increase Energy Security (Apr. 11, 2012), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/11/fact-sheet-obama-administration-
announces-additional-steps-increase-ener [https://perma.cc/53LE-DF34]. 
 171 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(1). 
 172 Id. § 4565(d)(2). 
 173 Id. § 4565(d)(4). 
 174 Id. § 4565(f)(6), (10). These factors are: domestic production needs; availability of domestic 
industries to meet national defense requirements; the extent to which foreign control affects the ability to 
meet national defense requirements; effects on military sales to other countries, domestic international 
technological leadership, critical infrastructure, and critical technologies; whether it is a foreign-
government-controlled transaction; compliance with treaties and the relationship between the United 
States and the foreign nation; domestic energy needs; and any other factors the President deems 
“appropriate.” Id. § 4565(f). 
 175 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-
in-the-united-states-cfius [https://perma.cc/B4Q4-HC94]; Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 
758 F.3d. 296, 30102 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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This § 721 authority has only been used a few times. President Obama 
used it once to prohibit foreign investment in a wind farm and once to prevent 
foreign investment in a semiconductor corporation.176 President Trump has 
used it at least twice during his presidency, once to prevent foreign 
investment in semiconductor corporations177 and once to prevent foreign 
investment in a global technology corporation.178 There also may have been 
other instances where foreign investors abandoned potential acquisitions of 
U.S. mining corporations because of early concerns raised by CFIUS.179 
2. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) 
Congress also delegated substantial unilateral powers to the President 
under the IEEPA, a statute that confers broad authority to regulate financial 
and other commercial transactions involving designated entities, including 
the power to impose sanctions on individuals and countries.180 Unlike the 
DPA, the emergency provisions of the IEEPA may only be activated by a 
president’s declaration of a national emergency.181 Section 203 of the IEEPA 
provides the President with the sole power to “investigate, regulate, or 
prohibit” any foreign transactions, foreign transfers of credit or payments, or 
import or export of currency or securities, and block any transportation, 
 
 176 Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 301–02; Press Release, The White House, Presidential Order -- 
Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of a Controlling Interest in Aixtron SE by Grand Chip Investment 
GMBH (Dec. 2, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/02/presidential-
order-regarding-proposed-acquisition-controlling-interest [https://perma.cc/W7S2-GKFJ]. 
 177 Press Release, The White House, Statement from the Press Secretary on President Donald J. 
Trump’s Decision Regarding Lattice Semiconductor Corporation (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-president-donald-j-trumps-
decision-regarding-lattice-semiconductor-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/399Y-U4X3] (citing the 
national security risk as “the potential transfer of intellectual property to the foreign acquirer, the Chinese 
government’s role in supporting this transaction”). 
 178 Other Presidential Documents, 2019 C.F.R. 909, 921–22; Press Release, Sec’y Mnuchin, 
Statement on the President’s Decision Regarding Broadcom’s Takeover Attempt of Qualcomm (Mar. 12, 
2018), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0309 [https://perma.cc/XXA7-XHT8] 
(explaining that because of the “sensitivities” of the transaction, the President did not explain his 
reasoning for blocking the transaction); see also Timeline: Broadcom-Qualcomm Saga Comes to an 
Abrupt End (Mar. 14, 2018, 9:27 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcom-
timeline/timeline-broadcom-qualcomm-saga-comes-to-an-abrupt-end-idUSKCN1GQ22N 
[https://perma.cc/922N-W84P]. 
 179 See Darshak S. Dholakia, Impact of Growing Global Investment Controls on the Mining Sector, 
63 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 20A-1, 20A-56 (2017) (discussing how potential acquisitions of mining 
operations were abandoned after CFIUS raised concerns during review). 
 180 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1). 
 181 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified 
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 and 18 U.S.C. § 4565); CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE INTERNATIONAL 
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QN9-BTHP]. 
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importation, or other actions involving any property in which any foreign 
country has an interest.182 Therefore, if a petroleum shortage is sufficiently 
severe to invoke a presidentially declared national emergency, the IEEPA 
could be used to control supplies of petroleum products in which foreign 
countries or foreign nationals have an “interest.”183 
Congress imposed a few limitations on this power. First, § 202 provides 
that the President may use this authority only to deal with “any unusual and 
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside 
the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the 
United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to 
such threat.”184 Second, § 204 provides that “[t]he President, in every 
possible instance, shall consult with the Congress before exercising any of 
the authorities granted by this chapter and shall consult regularly with the 
Congress so long as such authorities are exercised.”185 The House report also 
suggests that the President is not allowed to regulate wholly domestic 
transactions.186 
Presidents have frequently relied upon the IEEPA when declaring 
national emergencies, including for investigating foreign interference in 
elections,187 securing the information and communications technology and 
services supply chain,188 and even for preventing financial support for 
international investigations into American war crimes in Afghanistan.189 In 
the energy realm, President Obama relied in part on the IEEPA to support 
 
 182 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. § 1701. 
 185 Id. § 1703(a). 
 186 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LEGAL AUTHORITIES AVAILABLE TO THE PRESIDENT TO RESPOND TO A 
SEVERE ENERGY SUPPLY INTERRUPTION OR OTHER SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN AVAILABLE 
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 681 (1982) (first citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 10–11 (1977); and then citing 
S. REP. NO. 95-466, at 5 (1977)), https://www.justice.gov/file/23221/download [https://perma.cc/DF4T-
FNW2]. 
 187 See supra notes 53–54; see also Exec. Order No. 13,848, 83 Fed. Reg 46,843 (Sept. 12, 2018) 
(detailing President Trump’s national emergency declaration regarding foreign interference in the U.S. 
election). 
 188 Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 15, 2019) (securing the information and 
communications technology and services supply chain). 
 189 Exec. Order No. 13,930, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,139 (June 11, 2020) (prohibiting the contribution of 
funds, goods, or services to any foreign person to have “directly engaged in any effort by the ICC to 
investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any personnel of a country that is an ally of the United States 
without the consent of that country’s government”). 
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his executive order on cybersecurity.190 Similarly, President Trump used it to 
limit petroleum-product imports from Iran,191 and to cut ties with Venezuela 
in part because Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro, “degrade[s] 
Venezuela’s infrastructure and natural environment through economic 
mismanagement and confiscatory mining and industrial practices.”192 
Most recently, President Trump used the IEEPA to issue an executive 
order prohibiting the acquisition, transfer, or installation of any bulk-power 
system193 electric equipment manufactured or supplied “by persons owned 
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction . . . of a foreign adversary” 
that “poses an undue risk of catastrophic effects on the security or resiliency 
of United States critical infrastructure or the economy of the United 
States.”194 While it is imperative to protect the security of the bulk-power 
system, the executive order is exceptionally broad and potentially retroactive 
(it applies to all pending and future transactions).195 The executive order does 
recognize that expertise to respond to such emergencies lies in the expert 
energy agencies, with President Trump delegating his IEEPA authority to 
respond to the emergency to the Secretary of Energy and requiring the 
Secretary of Energy to coordinate and consult with other agency heads such 
as the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Interior.196 
B. Specific Presidential Emergency Energy Powers 
Congress has also delegated substantial authority over energy-grid 
emergencies to the President within specific energy statutes.197 This Section 
discusses three such energy statutes: (1) the Federal Power Act, (2) the 
Natural Gas Act, and (3) the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. 
 
 190 Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 1, 2015). He also relied on the National 
Emergencies Act (NEA) (50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51), § 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 (8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)), and § 301 of Title 3 of the U.S. Code. Id. 
 191 Exec. Order No. 13,846, 83 Fed. Reg. 38,939 (Aug. 6, 2018). 
 192 Exec. Order No. 13,850, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,243 (Nov. 1, 2018). 
 193 The “bulk-power system electric equipment” is defined broadly and includes any equipment used 
in substations, control rooms, or power-generating stations. Exec. Order No. 13,920, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,595 
(May 1, 2020). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See infra Appendix A for a full list. A number of emergency energy provisions merely address 
employment, licensing, inspections, or exchanges of supplies. This Section focuses on the three most 
substantive emergency energy provisions. 
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1. The Federal Power Act 
The Federal Power Act (FPA) provides two specific grants of 
emergency authority to the President and two such grants to an expert energy 
agency. The first unilateral FPA emergency delegation to the President 
appears in § 215A, a provision that Congress added in 2015 as part of the 
Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act.198 Section 215A 
provides the President with the sole power to declare a “grid security 
emergency.”199 The statute defines a grid-security emergency as “the 
occurrence or imminent danger of” (1) a “malicious act using electronic 
communication or an electromagnetic pulse” that disrupts the operation of 
devices and networks “that are essential to the reliability of” the critical or 
defense electric infrastructure;200 or (2) a “direct physical attack” on critical 
or defense electric infrastructure that results in “significant adverse effects 
on the reliability of critical . . . or defense critical electric infrastructure.”201 
The President’s declaration of such a grid-security emergency is 
required to unlock the Secretary’s authority to then issue orders for 
emergency measures “to protect or restore the reliability” of critical or 
defense electric infrastructure during such emergency.202 Congress defined 
“the Secretary” as “the Secretary of Energy”203 (also known as the Secretary 
of the DOE) and has provided the Secretary with significant discretion to 
address the emergency with measures “as are necessary in the judgment of 
the Secretary.”204 Congress cabined the President’s declaration of a grid 
emergency with nothing but the statutory definition and a post hoc 
notification requirement to “congressional committees of relevant 
jurisdiction.”205 However, it did provide for automatic expiration of grid-
security emergency orders after fifteen days, although they are subject to 
repeated renewals.206 Section 215A has never been invoked. 
 
 198 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 215A, 129 Stat. 1312, 1774 
(2015) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(b)(1)). 
 199 Id. § 215A, 129 Stat. at 1773 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(a)(7)). 
 200 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(a)(7)(A). 
 201 Id. § 824o-1(a)(7)(B). 
 202 Id. § 824o-1(b)(1); see also Exec. Order No. 13,744, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,573 (Oct. 13, 2016) (stating 
that “[t]he Secretary of Energy shall facilitate the protection and restoration of the reliability of the 
electrical power grid during a presidentially declared grid security emergency”). 
 203 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(a)(8). 
 204 Id. § 824o-1(b)(1). 
 205 Id. § 824o-1(b)(2). In contrast, Congress requires the DOE to “consult with appropriate 
governmental authorities in Canada and Mexico,” entities affected by the orders, FERC, and “other 
appropriate Federal agencies regarding implementation.” Id. § 824o-1(b)(3). 
 206 Id. § 824o-1(b)(5)(A)–(B). 
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The second unilateral FPA emergency delegation to the President 
appears in § 809. Under § 809, Congress also provides the President with 
authority to “enter” and “take possession” of any licensed project to 
manufacture war provisions “or for any other purpose involving the safety 
of the United States” based solely on the “opinion of the President” that “the 
safety of the United States demands” it.207 No independent presidential 
emergency declaration is required,208 and a licensed project under FPA § 809 
could include anything from the construction of a power house to the 
renovation of a dam or power lines.209 To date, this provision has never been 
used.210 
The third FPA emergency provision, § 202(c), delegates authority not 
to the President, but to “the Commission,” defined as the “Federal Power 
Commission,” the predecessor of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC).211 Interestingly, although the text of § 202(c) refers to 
“the Commission,” Congress later delegated power to the Secretary of the 
DOE rather than to FERC.212 In § 202(c), Congress provides the DOE with 
the power to order temporary connections between facilities that generate, 
 
 207 Id. § 809 (“When in the opinion of the President of the United States, evidenced by a written 
order addressed to the holder of any license under this chapter, the safety of the United States demands 
it, the United States shall have the right to enter upon and take possession of any project or part thereof, 
constructed, maintained, or operated under said license, for the purpose of manufacturing nitrates, 
explosives, or munitions of war, or for any other purpose involving the safety of the United States, to 
retain possession, management, and control thereof for such length of time as may appear to the President 
to be necessary to accomplish said purposes, and then to restore possession and control to the party or 
parties entitled thereto . . . .”). Congress does provide for just compensation to avoid Fifth Amendment 
violations. Ga. Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of Land, Etc., 563 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1977), overruled in part 
by Ga. Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980). Notably, because this provision does not 
reference an “emergency,” it was not captured in Appendix B but was added to Appendix A as another 
statutory energy emergency provision. 
 208 16 U.S.C. § 809. 
 209 See id. § 796(11) (defining the term “project” in the FPA). 
 210 FERC has indicated, however, that it would waive temporary federal use of a facility under § 809 
for minor license renewals. Hydroelectric Relicensing Regulations Under the Federal Power Act, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 23,756–61 (May 17, 1989). 
 211 Federal Power Act § 202(c), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c). 
 212 Under § 301(d) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (DOE Act), 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b), 
the powers previously vested in the Federal Power Commission under the FPA (and other statutes) and 
not expressly reserved to FERC were transferred to, and vested in, the Secretary of Energy. Although the 
DOE Act reserved to FERC powers to require interconnection of electric facilities under § 202(b) of the 
FPA, and DOE has since delegated certain other powers, including those provided by § 202(a) to FERC, 
§ 202(c) authority remains with the Secretary of Energy. Id. § 7172(a)(1) (“There are transferred to, and 
vested in, the Commission the following functions . . . the interconnection, under section 202(b), of [the 
Federal Power Act], of facilities for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy (other than 
emergency interconnection [which remains with the Secretary of Energy]) . . . .”). 
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transmit, exchange, or deliver electricity.213 However, this power is 
constrained only when the DOE determines that an emergency exists by 
reason of five circumstances: (1) a sudden increase in the demand for electric 
energy; (2) a shortage of electric energy; (3) a shortage of facilities for the 
generation or transmission of electric energy; (4) a shortage of fuel or water 
for generating facilities; or (5) other causes.214 This authority is only cabined 
where there is a conflict with environmental laws.215 The DOE has only 
issued seventeen orders under this provision since 1935, traditionally in 
response to a utility request as opposed to a DOE-initiated order.216 
The last FPA provision allows FERC to “enter into contracts with 
public or private power systems for the mutual exchange of unused excess 
power” to provide “emergency or break-down relief.”217 There is no evidence 
that this narrow provision has ever been used by FERC. 
2. The Natural Gas Act 
The Natural Gas Act (NGA) provides the President with three unilateral 
powers related to energy emergencies. Like the FPA’s “grid-security 
emergency” provision, the NGA provides the President with unilateral 
 
 213 Federal Power Act § 202(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1). The Commission can order five actions: 
(1) temporary connections of facilities; (2) generation of electric energy; (3) delivery of electric energy; 
(4) interchange of electricity; or (5) transmission of electricity. 
 214 Federal Power Act § 202(c), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c)(1). 
 215 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c); see also Joel deJesus, New Grid Security Measures for 2016, PUB. UTILS. 
FORT., Feb. 2016, at 43 (tailoring DOE’s emergency orders narrowly to the “hours necessary to meet the 
emergency and serve the public interest” and noting that an entity’s compliance with such order “shall 
not be considered a violation” of any federal, state, or local environmental law). 
 216 For example, the most frequently used provision is FPA § 202(c). DOE lists eight times that it 
has issued orders since 2000. See infra note 265. Additional orders prior to 2000 include: Carolina 
Aluminum Co., 2 F.P.C. 998, 998–99 (1941); Duke Power Co., 2 F.P.C. 992, 992 (1941) (detailing the 
same emergency declaration in North Carolina as Carolina Aluminum Co. but issuing different orders in 
response); Fla. Power & Light Co. 2 F.P.C. 991, 991 (1941) (interconnection in Florida); Puget Sound 
Power & Light Co., 6 F.P.C. 320, 320 (1947) (interconnection in the Pacific Northwest); Tex. Elec. Serv. 
Co., 9 F.P.C. 1373, 1373 (1950) (interconnection in Texas); Commonwealth Edison Co., 16 F.P.C. 1145, 
1146 (1956) (regarding a previous emergency); Ga. Power Co., 35 F.P.C. 629, 631 (1966) 
(interconnection in Georgia); Ky. Utils. Co., 70 P.U.R.3d 475 (1967) (interconnections in Kentucky); 
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 47 F.P.C. 1412, 1412–13 (1972) (detailing that the Federal Power 
Commission issued a § 202(c) order requiring interconnection between utility and city); see also Long 
Island Lighting Co., 33 N.R.C. 61 (1991) (acknowledging that, while unused, it could be an alternate 
authority to justify an order to continue operation of a nuclear plant). DOE rejected finding an emergency 
during the oil embargo because the agency was able to facilitate successful corporation without declaring 
an emergency. New Eng. Power Pool Participants, 54 F.P.C. 1375, 1375 (1975). 
 217 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 832d(b), amended by Department of Energy Organization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 302(b), 91 Stat. 565, 578–79 (1977). 
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authority to declare a “natural gas supply emergency.”218 But unlike the FPA, 
which defines a grid security emergency, the term “natural gas supply 
emergency” is not defined in the NGA. The statute does, however, provide 
two conditions that the President must meet before making such an 
emergency declaration: (1) that a severe natural gas supply shortage that 
endangers the supply of high-priority uses exists or is imminent; and (2) that 
other alternatives have been exhausted and the President finds that the 
“exercise of authorities under this section is reasonably necessary . . . to the 
maximum extent practicable, to assist in meeting natural gas requirements 
for such high-priority uses.”219 
The President’s declaration of such a natural gas supply emergency is 
required to unlock significant statutory authority to (1) prohibit the burning 
of natural gas by any electric powerplant,220 (2) authorize the purchase of 
emergency supplies of natural gas,221 and (3) allocate supplies of natural gas 
to different entities.222 Congress also provided that a declaration of a natural 
gas supply emergency terminates when the President finds that the shortage 
is no longer imminent or in existence, or when 120 days after the date of the 
declaration have passed, whichever is earlier.223 Congress again allowed for 
extensions of such emergencies. However, the President is only allowed to 
renew the emergency every 120 days in seeming perpetuity so long as the 
President finds that the two conditions required to initially declare the natural 
gas supply emergency continue to be satisfied.224 
3. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
In the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), Congress provides 
the President with the sole power to take a number of energy conservation 
measures to respond to an actual or potential shortfall in domestic or 
international petroleum supplies upon a finding by the President that a 
“severe energy supply interruption” exists or to fulfill “obligations of the 
United States under the international energy program.”225 A “severe energy 
 
 218 Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717z(a), amended by Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 607, 92 Stat. 3117, 3171. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. § 717z(c). 
 221 Id. § 3362(a). 
 222 Id. § 3363(a). 
 223 Id. § 717z(b)(1). 
 224 Id. § 717z(a); id. § 717z(b)(2). 
 225 Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) § 3(8), 42 U.S.C. § 6202(8); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
LEGAL AUTHORITIES AVAILABLE TO THE PRESIDENT TO RESPOND TO A SEVERE ENERGY SUPPLY 
INTERRUPTION OR OTHER SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN AVAILABLE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 651–52 
(1982), https://www.justice.gov/file/23221/download [https://perma.cc/C9QM-4R4U] (“The IEP, 
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supply interruption” is defined as a national energy supply shortage that the 
President determines 
(A) is, or is likely to be, of significant scope and duration, and of an emergency 
nature; 
(B) may cause major adverse impact on national safety or the national economy; 
and 
(C) results, or is likely to result, from [] an interruption in the supply of imported 
petroleum products . . . or [] sabotage . . . or an act of God.226 
This finding unlocks the President’s sole authority to take several 
measures, a number of which are related to the electric grid. For instance, 
even though power plants rely on petroleum to power less than 1% of the 
electric grid, coal provides 23%.227 A “severe energy supply interruption” 
would allow the President to take the following steps: 
 to “allocate coal (and require the transportation thereof) for the 
use of any electric powerplant or major fuel-burning 
installation . . . to insure reliability of electric service or prevent 
unemployment, or protect public health, safety, or welfare”;228 
 to “prohibit any electric powerplant or major fuel-burning 
installation from using natural gas or petroleum, or both, as a 
primary energy source for the duration of such interruption”;229 
 to “drawdown and sell petroleum products” in the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve”;230 and 
 to “stay the application of any provision of this chapter, or any 
rule or order thereunder, applicable to any new or existing 
electric powerplant, if the President finds, and publishes such 
finding, that an emergency exists, due to national, regional, or 
systemwide shortages of coal or other alternate fuels, or 
disruption of transportation facilities, which emergency is likely 
 
established in 1974 by the Agreement on an International Energy Program (Agreement), to which the 
United States is a signatory, provides for coordinated action among the 21 members (Participating 
Countries) in order to decrease their vulnerability to supply disruptions and dependence on imported 
oil.”). 
 226 EPCA § 3(8), 42 U.S.C. § 6202(8); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 225, at 651–52. 
 227 See Electricity Explained, supra note 18. 
 228 42 U.S.C. § 8374(a). 
 229 Id. § 8374(b). 
 230 Id. § 6241(a), (d). This power can also be triggered by a need to meet the obligations of the United 
States under the international energy program. Id. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is a program requiring 
storage of up to one billion barrels of petroleum in facilities to “reduce the impact of disruptions in 
supplies of petroleum products” and to “diminish the vulnerability of the United States to the effects of a 
severe energy supply interruption.” Id. § 6231. President Trump ordered the Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
to be filled to capacity during the latest COVID-19 pandemic. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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to affect reliability of service of any such electric 
powerplant.”231 
Although these emergency energy powers have been used sparingly to 
date,232 relatively recent presidential actions have indicated an increased 
willingness to call upon national security powers during questionable 
national emergencies.233 Such actions heighten the urgency to reassess the 
assumptions underlying such delegations of unilateral presidential control. 
III. REASSESSING THE TRADEOFFS OF UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL 
CONTROL OVER ENERGY EMERGENCIES 
After a review of these delegations of emergency energy authority 
directly to the President, one might remark on the notable absence of agency 
involvement in almost all electric grid emergencies, placing these 
delegations squarely in the upper-left quadrant (Strong President/Weak 
Agency) of our Executive Delegations Matrix.234 As discussed in Part I, the 
four primary justifications for this unilateral control are generally assumed 
to outweigh any negative impacts on checks and balances and judicial 
review.  
Given the somewhat unusual placement of emergency grid powers in 
the unilateral presidential powers quadrant of the matrix developed in Part I, 
this last Part tests the four justifications of expertise, accountability, 
consistency, and expediency for this type of unilateral presidential control. 
It concludes that Congress may be able to better realize these values by 
incorporating expert agencies into these emergency decisions, as they did 
with a number of provisions, moving toward the upper-right quadrant 
(Strong President/Strong Agency) of the Executive Delegations Matrix.235 
Although devoid of all the nuances discussed below, Figure 2 provides a 
simplified snapshot of these power dynamics between the President and an 
agency and the values that may be realized by the four different 
combinations. This Part counters the common narrative justifying unilateral 
presidential control, using energy grid emergencies to demonstrate the 
 
 231 42 U.S.C. § 8374(c). 
 232 See supra Section II.B.1; supra note 215. 
 233 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (President Trump’s 
executive order that denied entry for immigrants stemmed in part from his statutory national security 
powers under the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
 234 See infra Appendix A (Strong President/Weak Agency). 
 235 See infra Appendix B (Strong President/Strong Agency). 
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important role of an agency delegate,236 even if the President is the ultimate 
decision-maker.  
 







Including agencies in emergency energy delegations is not entirely new. 
A number of emergency statutes provide mixed delegations requiring agency 
involvement prior to the President exercising such authority. As an example, 
Congress addresses national security issues under the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962 (TEA) using a shared delegation.237 Section 232(b) of 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1862(b) leaves the trigger to unlock emergency powers with the Secretary 
of Commerce. The Secretary must first investigate and find that a commodity 
is entering the country “in such quantities or under such circumstances as to 
threaten to impair the national security.”238 Only then shall the President take 
 
 236 Even Justice Stephen Breyer has stressed the benefits of depoliticized decision-making by the 
elite professional experts found in agencies. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: 
TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 55–56, 59–61 (1993). 
 237 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1991. This provision is reflected in Appendix A. 
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such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary “to adjust the imports 
of the article and its derivatives so that such imports [of the article] will not 
threaten to impair the national security.”239 As with the TEA, Congress 
provides a number of factors for the agency to consider in making its 
determination that the imports “threaten to impair the national security.”240 
Similarly, this Part explores the potential benefits of incorporating a 
larger role for an expert agency in conjunction with the President, to enhance 
emergency energy decision-making. First, delegating to an agency has the 
implicit advantage of imposing a consultation requirement on the President. 
The President would of course be free to ignore the unique expertise of her 
energy agencies, but it would slow down any uninformed knee-jerk reactions 
allowable under direct presidential delegations. It also explores the special 
case of independent energy agencies and their enhanced resistance to 
political pressure from the presidency. Second, delegating to an agency 
triggers the application of the APA, with its rulemaking requirements and 
corresponding judicial review, therefore enhancing accountability. Third, 
where a President must wield power through an agency, the President will 
likely consider the bureaucratic burdens and the depletion of political capital 
that is needed to massage an agency into doing her bidding.241 Because 
agencies may disagree with the President, there is at least an opportunity for 
agencies to influence the President’s decision-making. Furthermore, the role 
of the agency can be tailored to the type of energy emergency to minimize 
 
 239 Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 240 Id. § 1862(c) (listing the five factors). 
 241 See Kagan, supra note 33, at 2298 (“[A] President may face considerable constraints in imposing 
his will on administrative actors. Their resistance to or mere criticism of a directive may inflict political 
costs on the President as heavy as any that would result from an exercise of the removal power.”); 
Percival, supra note 39, at 2533 (“Even if the President’s removal authority enables him to fire the heads 
of executive agencies at will, requiring him to fire a resistant officer and replace him with an officer who 
will take the action he desires invariably has substantial political costs.”); Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic 
Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 163–65 (2018) (discussing ways in 
which bureaucrats resist presidential policy goals); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for 
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 151213 (1992) (discussing administrative agencies’ 
ability to effectively make law through political decision-making). However, some scholars believe 
instead that presidential control of agencies is the norm. See Kagan, supra note 33, at 2246 (“We live 
today in an era of presidential administration.”); Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American 
Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1833–35 (2012) (describing 
different presidential control theories and how presidential control has emerged since the 1980s with the 
Reagan Administration). Additionally, the bureaucratic burden and depletion of political capital may 
depend on the agency the President is attempting to assert control over. See Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony 
Bertelli, Christian R. Grose, David E. Lewis & David C. Nixon, Separated Powers in the United States: 
The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and Congress, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341, 34850 (2012) (conducting 
a study on agency ideology and finding that some agencies like the EPA and NLRB are much more liberal 
than others like the DOD and DHS). 
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the negative impacts on responsiveness. Particularly, the President would 
still be able to act unilaterally in the case of acute emergencies but would be 
subject to more procedural protections when addressing chronic 
emergencies.242 With these potential positive effects in mind, this Part tests 
the four justifications (expertise, accountability, consistency, and 
expediency) against energy emergencies. 
A. Expertise: Expert Energy Agencies 
Although the motivations behind Congress’s choice to delegate to 
agencies or to the President directly are often unclear,243 as I have 
demonstrated previously, national security drives many direct presidential 
delegations.244 The legislative history of these emergency energy delegations 
is sparse, but a few comments equating an energy emergency to a national 
security emergency suggest that national security was the driving force of 
these decisions as well.245 In the House report discussing the DPA, for 
instance, Congress made the link between energy supplies and national 
security explicit: “The ‘Declaration of Policy’ is amended to make it clear 
that it is necessary and appropriate, indeed essential, ‘to assure domestic 
energy supplies for national defense needs.’”246 The legislative history of 
§ 232(b) of the TEA similarly establishes that increasing the domestic 
production of oil is a legitimate national security aim.247 Other factors 
suggest, however, that it is not national security expertise that is most needed 
in energy emergencies. Instead, this Section demonstrates how the nature of 
energy emergencies is changing. The prior focus on oil is shifting to a focus 
on the electric grid, triggering corresponding demands for more technical 
 
 242 Stein, supra note 3, at 1252–56. 
 243 Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 289–90; see Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative 
Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036–37 (2006) (discussing possible factors that might be considered by 
legislators when choosing delegation between agencies and courts). 
 244 See Stein, supra note 3, at 1194 (documenting the President’s unilateral power “to reject 
sanctions, to waive sanctions for ‘a significant foreign narcotics trafficker,’ to waive the prohibition 
against involuntary extension of enlistments of military personnel, to waive attachment of foreign 
property to satisfy judgments, and to deny a request to inspect facilities in the United States” (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting 21 U.S.C. §1903(g)(1))). 
 245 One energy exception where Congress reserved its power to trigger the emergency powers is the 
Atomic Energy Act, which only authorizes the Atomic Energy Commission—now the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission—to suspend nuclear licenses, order recapture of nuclear materials, or order the 
operation of a nuclear facility when “Congress declares that a state of war or national emergency exists,” 
if the Commission finds that “in its judgment such action is necessary to the common defense and 
security.” Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2138 (emphasis added). 
 246 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1104, at 187 (1980). 
 247 See, e.g., 104 CONG. REC. 10,542–43 (June 9, 1958) (statement of Rep. Mills). 
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expertise, including that of independent energy agencies, to address energy 
emergencies of the future. 
1. Growing Value of Technical Expertise 
Although some may argue that the President is an expert in areas of 
national security,248 the evolving nature of energy emergencies is weakening 
traditional arguments for unilateral presidential control. The historic fear of 
a shortage of critical fossil fuels, which has national security implications, is 
shifting to a fear of electric grid disruptions and widespread blackouts, which 
are much more insular and domestic, negating the need for a solo 
Commander in Chief.  
Most twentieth-century scholars and policymakers contemplated that 
an energy emergency would occur due to a shortage of key fossil fuels such 
as oil and natural gas,249 two primary energy sources that then constituted the 
majority of U.S. energy consumption, but that were not produced in 
sufficient amounts domestically.250 The reliance on these imports from 
foreign nations fueled much of the fear over energy emergencies.251 Further, 
many of these emergency powers were forged during wartime,252 with their 
uses likely anticipated for similar types of emergencies. 
 
 248 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018); see also Shirin Sinnar, Procedural 
Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 991, 999 (2018) (discussing 
the traditional deference to the President on national security issues on the basis of speed, flexibility, and 
access to knowledge). Professor Shirin Sinnar ultimately argues for less deference to the President but 
has a thorough discussion of the reasoning behind deference to the executive in national security matters. 
See id. 
 249 See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Bialos, Oil Imports and National Security: The Legal and Policy Framework 
for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resources, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 235, 270–74 (1989); 
Earle H. O’Donnell & Laurel W. Glassman, Energy Emergencies: Constitutional Constraints on State 
Efforts to Control Oil Supplies and Prices, 5 ENERGY L.J. 77, 77 (1984); James M. Summers, The Case 
for Decontrolling the Price and Allocation of Crude Oil, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (1975); DEP’T OF 
JUST., LEGAL AUTHORITIES AVAILABLE TO THE PRESIDENT TO RESPOND TO A SEVERE ENERGY SUPPLY 
INTERRUPTION OR OTHER SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN AVAILABLE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (1982). 
 250 Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy 1850–2017, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., 
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/oil-dependence-and-us-foreign-policy [https://perma.cc/39D3-7LJG]. 
 251 See, e.g., Joseph Mamounas, Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets: The 
Challenge of Maintaining National Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World, 13 LAW & BUS. 
REV. AMS. 381, 382–83, 404 (2007); Tracey A. LeBeau, Energy Security and Increasing North American 
Oil and Gas Production, 16 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 193, 193 (2002); Matthew E. Chen & Amy Meyers Jaffe, 
Energy Security: Meeting the Growing Challenge of National Oil Companies, 8 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & 
INT’L RELS. 9, 18–20 (2007); Surya Gablin Gunasekara, A Sticky Situation: Oil Sands, Alternative Fuels, 
Energy Security, and the EISA Section 526 Petroleum-Procurement Problem, 3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY 
& ENV’T L. 248, 248–50 (2012). 
 252 See Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717z (passed first in 1978, three years after the Vietnam War); 
IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (passed first in 1977, two years after the end of the Vietnam War); EPCA, 
42 U.S.C. § 6202 (passed first in 1975, the same year the Vietnam War ended); Federal Power Act, 
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However, twenty-first-century scholars have different energy-
emergency concerns. Although the United States still relies on oil, coal, and 
natural gas for approximately 80% of domestic energy consumption,253 our 
fears of a shortage have been tempered by increasing domestic production of 
both resources.254 For the first time in decades, the United States has become 
a net exporter of oil, alleviating peak oil concerns.255 And developers in the 
early 2000s applied hydraulic fracturing technology to previously 
economically unrecoverable natural gas shale formations to usher in a natural 
gas supply boom.256 
With fossil fuel supplies now in abundance domestically, energy 
emergencies of today will instead generally focus on the reliability of the 
electric grid.257 Grid-reliability emergencies can be caused by many sources, 
including operator error;258 inadequate planning; cybersecurity attacks;259 
natural disasters;260 physical disruptions to the generation, transmission, or 
distribution facilities; physical attacks on energy infrastructure261 market 
structure,262 or even an overgrown tree.263 The increasing automation of the 
grid heightens these concerns, creating millions of hackable points. These 
 
16 U.S.C. § 824o-1 (passed first in 1920, in the midst of World War I); Earle H. O’Donnell & Laurel W. 
Glassman, After the EPAA: What Oil Allocation and Pricing Authorities Remain?, 2 ENERGY L. J. 33, 41 
(1981) (“The DPA was enacted on September 8, 1950, in the context of, and in response to, the Korean 
War.”). 
 253 Energy Facts: Consumption and Production, supra note 14. 
 254 Id. (finding that the U.S. domestic production is now greater than energy consumption). 
 255 See id.; supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 256 ZHONGMIN WANG & ALAN KRUPNICK, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, US SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT: 
WHAT LED TO THE BOOM? (2013). 
 257 One notable exception was the energy emergency of April 2020 when the COVID-19 shutdown 
resulted in a surplus of oil with no place for storage. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 258 See OFF. OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, supra note 21, at 1–10. 
 259 See sources cited supra note 22. 
 260 See sources cited supra note 21. 
 261 See Rebecca Smith, Assault on California Power Station Raises Alarm on Potential for 
Terrorism, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/assault-on-california-power-
station-raises-alarm-on-potential-for-terrorism-1391570879 [https://perma.cc/2QJN-X85W]; MCLARTY 
& RIDGE, supra note 22, at 25–36; Avi Schnurr, Vulnerability of National Power Grids to 
Electromagnetic Threats: Domestic and International Perspectives, 34 ENERGY L.J. 1, 6, 18 (2013); U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR APRIL 2020 (2020), 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.php?t=epmt_b_1 [https://perma.cc/J2XQ-
L9D4]. 
 262 Robert Walton, ERCOT Calls 2 Energy Emergencies in One Week, 3rd in 5 Years, UTIL. DIVE 
(Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ercot-calls-2nd-energy-emergency-this-week-3rd-in-
5-years/561065/ [https://perma.cc/24YN-5NE9]. 
 263 JR Minkel, The 2003 Northeast Blackout–Five Years Later, SCI. AM. (Aug. 13, 2008), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/2003-blackout-five-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/E2S4-
KQXA]. 
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concerns are further exacerbated by an ever-increasing reliance on 
technology across our society, with every cell phone, computer, military 
installation, and refrigeration-and-cooling system dependent on electricity. 
While rolling blackouts are disruptive, an extended loss of electricity could 
be catastrophic.264 If history is any example, the instances where emergency-
energy authority has been used more frequently have surrounded technical 
issues about the amount of generation or transmission capacity available on 
the grid.265 
Recent events reflect the changing nature of an energy emergency. For 
instance, an energy emergency in Montana erupted when additional energy 
resources were needed to address wildfires.266 On the flip side, wildfires 
created an energy emergency in California, where rolling blackouts were 
instituted to address threatened damage to the electric grid.267 And an energy 
 
 264 Alyssa Flores, California Begins Rolling Blackouts for the First Time in 19 Years, Stage 3 
Emergency Declared, ABC30 (Aug. 15, 2020), https://abc30.com/electricity-power-flex-alert-
demand/6371510/ [https://perma.cc/VDV4-9NWL]; DEP’T OF ENERGY, STRATEGIC SPECTRUM PLAN 21 
(2007) (“DOE published a total cost estimate of about $6 billion dollars as attributable to the 2003 power 
outage.”); OFF. OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 21, at 
6 (noting that for a power company in New Orleans, blackouts result in a cost of “$260 to $325 million 
and a loss of customer revenue estimated at $147 million”); James Wagner & Frances Robles, Puerto 
Rico Is Once Again Hit by an Islandwide Blackout, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/us/puerto-rico-power-outage.html [https://perma.cc/HHB6-
NVC3] (discussing the costs of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico—close to $2.5 billion). 
 265 DOE’s use of § 202(c) since 2000 includes: 12/14/00 emergency order to address California 
energy crisis; 8/16/02 order requiring the Cross-Sound Cable to continue operating; 8/14/03 order 
requiring the Cross-Sound Cable to continue operating in response to a blackout; 8/24/05 order requiring 
the operation of the Potomac River generating station; 9/28/05 order authorizing CenterPoint Energy to 
temporarily connect electricity lines to restore power to Entergy Gulf States in response to Hurricane 
Katrina; 9/14/08 order authorizing CenterPoint Energy to temporarily connect electricity lines to restore 
power to Entergy Gulf States in response to Hurricane Ike; 4/14/07 order authorizing a state-owned utility 
in Oklahoma to operate its generating unit as needed to provide dynamic reactive power support; 6/16/07 
order authorizing PJM Interconnection to direct operation of generation units under strictly limited 
conditions for reliability purposes. DOE’s Use of Federal Power Act Emergency Authority Archived, OFF. 
OF ELEC., https://www.energy.gov/oe/does-use-federal-power-act-emergency-authority-archived 
[https://perma.cc/7X5Q-6H47] (prior to 2015); DOE’s Use of Federal Power Act Emergency Authority 
Archived, OFF. OF ELEC., https://www.energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-
implementation/other-regulatory-efforts/does-use [https://perma.cc/V5E9-UCWK] (after 2015); see also 
Jeff St. John, Legal Considerations for DOE’s Leaked Coal and Nuclear Bailout Plan, GREEN TECH 
MEDIA (June 6, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/legal-doe-leaked-coal-and-
nuclear-bailout-plan#gs.ovo3wb [https://perma.cc/XSV6-QVXY]. 
 266 MTN News, Governor Declares State of Energy Emergency as Wildfires Flare, MISSOULA 
CURRENT (July 28, 2019), https://missoulacurrent.com/outdoors/2019/07/montana-wildfires-emergency/ 
[https://perma.cc/AL9N-PL94]. 
 267 The California Public Utilities Commission approved public-safety power-shutoff rules for the 
big three utilities. De-Energization (PSPS), CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/deenergization/ [https://perma.cc/SS93-VLUC] (“The State’s investor-owned 
electric utilities, notably Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), Southern California Edison, and 
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emergency was caused by the first malicious “cyber event” that disrupted 
grid operations in the western United States.268 Additionally, prior 
presidential administrations have used statutory emergency energy powers 
to successfully address hurricanes,269 pandemics,270 and terrorist attacks. 
Arguments that the President is more qualified to address energy 
emergencies are also weakened when one sees how Congress has made its 
delegate decisions with respect to environmental emergencies. Congress has 
delegated almost all environmental emergency powers to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), an agency with well-recognized and specific 
expertise in environmental matters, with its emergency powers as follows:271 
 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)’s “Emergency Powers”: 
“[T]he Administrator . . . may take such actions as he may deem 
necessary in order to protect the health” of persons upon receipt 
of information about a drinking water contaminant that may 
present an “imminent and substantial endangerment.”272 
 Clean Water Act (CWA)’s “Emergency Powers”: “[T]he 
Administrator” may take any actions necessary to address water 
pollution presenting “an imminent and substantial 
endangerment” to public health or welfare.273 
 Clean Air Act (CAA)’s “Emergency Powers”: The EPA may take 
actions necessary to abate air pollution presenting an “imminent 
and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare.”274 
 
San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), may shut off electric power . . . to protect public safety under 
California law . . . .”). 
 268 Sobczak, supra note 22. 
 269 See Proclamation No. 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 8, 2005) (declaring national emergency 
for Hurricane Katrina and suspending labor laws); see also BRENNAN REPORT, supra note 29, at 1 (noting 
that emergency declarations under the Disaster Relief Act have been issued on average nine times 
annually between 1974 and 2014). 
 270 Proclamation Concerning the Novel Coronavirus, supra note 69; Proclamation No. 8443, 
3 C.F.R. 148 (Oct. 23, 2009). 
 271 See, e.g., Helping Hand Tools v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 848 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(observing court’s obligation to “defer to EPA agency expertise”); Ohio Valley Env’t Coal. v. Horinko, 
279 F. Supp. 2d 732, 756 (S.D.W. Va. 2003) (“[T]he court will defer to the EPA’s reasonable 
interpretations . . . in light of the EPA’s particular knowledge and expertise in this area.”); Texas v. U.S. 
Env’t Prot. Agency, 690 F.3d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Our review is most deferential to the EPA’s fact 
findings, particularly where those findings relate to the EPA’s evaluation of scientific data for which the 
Agency possesses technical expertise.”); U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 830 F.3d 579, 636 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016) (“Our conclusion is driven, in large part, by the deference we owe the EPA when it determines 
how best to meet the technical challenges in its area of expertise.”). 
 272 Safe Drinking Water Act: Emergency Powers § 1431(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a). 
 273 Clean Water Act §§ 311, 504(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1364. 
 274 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7603. 
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 Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA)’s “Imminent Hazard” 
Powers: The EPA may take actions necessary to address the 
“disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste [that] may 
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or 
the environment.”275 
 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)’s “Emergency Powers”: 
The EPA has the right of first refusal to take actions necessary to 
address asbestos in schools that pose “an imminent and 
substantial endangerment” to human health or the environment.276 
 
Congress similarly delegated powers to address any public health and 
safety emergencies related to mining operations to the Department of the 
Interior. 277 The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 
unlike the FPA, NGA, and EPCA, provides the agency with the sole power 
to determine whether a coal-mining “emergency exists constituting a danger 
to the public health, safety, or general welfare” and “no other person or 
agency will act expeditiously to restore, reclaim, abate, control, or prevent 
the adverse effects of coal mining practices.”278 Even though coal is used to 
power the electric grid, these emergency powers relate to the environmental 
and public health and safety hazards that can result from mining operations 
that extract coal from the land, as opposed to supply issues of coal.279 
Administered by the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and 
Enforcement (OSMRE), and often delegated to the states to enforce (with 
oversight from OSMRE), the SMCRA delegates to the OSMRE expansive 
authority to enter and take actions to “restore, reclaim, abate, control, or 
prevent the adverse effects of coal mining” and protect public health and 
safety to respond to an emergency.280 This expansive authority resulted in 
three related emergency authorities for the Secretary of Interior: to (1) 
 
 275 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6973. 
 276 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2648. 
 277 For a comprehensive assessment of the many avenues that the Department of Interior can use to 
address national emergencies, see generally William G. Myers III & Karen E. Mouritsen, The Department 
of the Interior’s Role in National Emergencies, 16 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 177 (2002). 
 278 30 U.S.C. § 1240(a). 
 279 See, e.g., Pendleton v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 480, 481 (2000). The Office of Surface Mining 
(OSM) conducted its own investigation, determined that a landslide had occurred, that the potential 
existed for further damage, and that the emergency warranted remediation. Id. 
 280 30 U.S.C. § 1240(b). 
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acquire land in response to a coal emergency,281 (2) spend funds to respond 
to a coal emergency,282 and (3) suspend coal-mining exploration activities.283 
Congress similarly delegates substantial environmental emergency 
authorities to other agencies with expertise in their respective areas.284 In fact, 
the only environmental statute identified that delegates directly to the 
President to address an environmental emergency is the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
where the President is authorized to act for the removal of imminent 
hazardous-substance releases285 and seek remedial relief to address those 
releases.286 In those situations, the President is cabined by the national 
contingency plan developed by the EPA287 in making such authorizations.288 
Interestingly, even national security concerns did not motivate a change 
in delegation. Congress delegated the power to address contaminated 
drinking water under the SDWA to the agency, even where the source of the 
contaminant is “a threatened or potential terrorist attack (or other intentional 
act designed to disrupt the provision of safe drinking water or to impact 
adversely the safety of drinking water supplied to communities and 
 
 281 Id. § 1237. 
 282 Id. § 1240(a). 
 283 Id. § 1411(b)(2). 
 284 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 20104 (delegating emergency authority to the Secretary of Transportation 
to decide whether an unsafe condition or practice causes an emergency situation involving a hazard of 
death, personal injury, or significant harm to the environment and to immediately order restrictions and 
prohibitions as necessary); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) 
(delegating emergency authority to the “Secretary” or relevant congressional committee to withdraw land 
after determining that an emergency exists and that “extraordinary measures must be taken to preserve 
values that would otherwise be lost”); Federal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 811(a) 
(authorizes the Secretary of Labor to promulgate additional “mandatory health or safety standards for the 
protection of life and prevention of injuries in coal or other mines”). Another example is the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, where Congress perceived the industrial-safety problem to be so severe that it 
provided for an abbreviated procedure for summary promulgation of safety standards. 
 285 CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(9)(A) (allowing the 
President to act after an agency designation of “imminent and substantial endangerment”). 
 286 CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606. 
 287 CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (providing that “the President shall, after notice and 
opportunity for public comments, revise and republish the national contingency plan for the removal of 
oil and hazardous substances”). However, the President has delegated primary authority under this section 
to the EPA. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987) (reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9615). 
 288 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1); A&W Smelters and Refiners, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 302, at *5 (EAB 1996) (“On 
January 14, the three truckloads from Mexico were returned to the United States. Because A&W did not 
assume responsibility for these truckloads, and the four being released by the United States, the Region 
considered them abandoned, and exercised its emergency response authority under CERCLA to arrange 
for these truckloads to be transported to a nearby RCRA-approved hazardous waste treatment . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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individuals).”289 Similarly, Congress delegated power to the Secretary of 
Defense to determine if there is an imminent threat to a chemical facility 
from a terrorist threat.290 These delegations suggest that in certain 
circumstances, subject-matter expertise may trump even national security 
expertise. 
To confirm our suspicions about the uniquely unilateral delegations in 
the energy sector, we explored all of the emergency provisions in the U.S. 
Code.291 Our findings confirm both the general exclusion of expert agencies 
in emergencies related to the electric grid, as well as the general inclusion of 
expert agencies in other similarly technical sectors. For instance, similar to 
energy emergencies, food-and-drug and pandemic emergencies are often 
national in scope292 and arguably require the same level of expediency 
required to address an energy emergency. Nevertheless, in all eight of the 
emergency provisions related to food and drugs, Congress instead decided 
to vest the power to declare an emergency not to the President, but to the 
expert agency, the Food and Drug Administration.293 Even within the twenty 
energy emergency provisions that provide unilateral authority to an agency, 
only two address the electric grid. The remaining eighteen provisions address 
personnel, funding, public health and safety, environmental protection, and 
agreements to store oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.294 In fact, except 
in the area of foreign relations and armed forces, our research failed to turn 
up any other area of law with as much unilateral presidential power in 
emergencies as energy.295 
There may be an argument that energy emergencies have the potential 
to have more national impact than environmental emergencies, thus 
justifying presidential expertise. Even though an energy emergency may be 
confined to a local area, the interconnected nature of the grid means there is 
a higher risk of cascading effects, leading to potentially national impact.296 
 
 289 Safe Drinking Water Act § 1431(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a). 
 290 6 U.S.C. § 624. 
 291 See supra notes 106108. 
 292 See Proclamation Concerning the Novel Coronavirus, supra note 69; Food Safety During 
Emergencies, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/recalls-outbreaks-
emergencies/food-safety-during-emergencies [https://perma.cc/TFK7-8GHV]. 
 293 21 U.S.C. § 2225; id. § 360bbb; id. § 360bbb-3; id. § 360eee-1; id. § 371; id. § 379; id. § 379e; 
id. § 829. 
 294 See infra Appendix A (Weak President/Strong Agency). 
 295 Our research resulted in one emergency statute in telecommunications, one in labor, and two in 
agriculture. For comparison, there were fourteen statutes in foreign relations and intercourse. See infra 
Appendix A. 
 296 See MISSION SUPPORT CTR., IDAHO NAT’L LAB’Y, supra note 22, at 10 (noting that “bulk power 
in the U.S. is still currently delivered throughout an interconnected, interdependent, and in many areas 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
854 
Whereas local environmental pollution, such as that caused by coal, is also 
interconnected, its cascade effect may be more gradual.297 A second reason 
may be because environmental emergencies are perceived as requiring more 
expertise than energy emergencies.298 Perhaps there is something about the 
science of hydrology and contaminant paths that appears less accessible than 
the science of electrons. Regardless of the reason, although some energy 
emergencies may involve foreign interference justifying presidential action, 
many of them require a technical expertise that the President lacks.299 Thus, 
despite these critiques, as the nature of energy emergencies continues to 
evolve from wartime anxiety over our inability to fuel our own transportation 
and electricity needs to peacetime concerns about widespread grid blackouts, 
the need for a national security expert diminishes and the need for a technical 
grid expert increases. 
2. The Special Case of Independent Agencies 
A second factor that cuts in favor of involving agencies is the fact that 
one of our expert agencies, FERC, is an independent agency whose 
involvement could increase the President’s legitimacy in her decision-
making and the transparency of such decisions. This is worth discussing, 
because in addition to bureaucratic concerns, many critics too quickly 
dismiss the possibility that agencies can have any meaningful impact on a 
president’s decision-making.300 For those supporters of a unitary executive, 
including an executive agency would have minimal effect. The President will 
implement her will, whether it be through her own hand or through her 
agency pawn. This supports the need for involving an independent agency. 
Although there are a number of expert energy agencies, including the 
Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), the Department of Interior (DOI), and the newest addition, the 
 
aging grid” in assessing vulnerabilities from cyber and physical electric grid attacks); see also J.B. Ruhl, 
Governing Cascade Failures in Complex Social-Ecological-Technological Systems: Framing Context, 
Strategies, and Challenges, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 407 (2019). 
 297 See Debbie Elliott, 5 Years After BP Oil Spill, Effects Linger and Recovery Is Slow, NPR (Apr. 
10, 2015, 3:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/20/400374744/5-years-after-bp-oil-spill-effects-
linger-and-recovery-is-slow [https://perma.cc/RH4N-ARWB]. 
 298 Tracey L. Cloutier, Joined at the Hip: The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Deference—The Struggle for Power Has the EPA Caught in the Middle, 7 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 63, 
87 (2000). 
 299 Kovacs, supra note 55, at 565 (noting that “the President lacks the expertise of agencies”). 
 300 See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 76, at 1428–36 (describing how presidents have actually impeded 
agency decision-making by imposing various review requirements and filtering communication with the 
President through the Office of Management and Budget). 
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Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),301 the DOE 
appears to be chosen for purposes of energy emergencies rather than FERC. 
The DOE has been designated as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for 
energy, indicating a specialized expertise in the field.302 And as discussed 
above, one of the only emergency energy powers Congress delegated to an 
agency under FPA § 202(c) eventually ended up with the DOE. The DOE 
may have become the expert agency of choice again because of its status as 
an executive agency as opposed to an independent agency.303 As discussed 
below, historically FERC, unlike the DOE, has not hesitated to oppose 
actions and deny rules it deems to be imprudent, even if the actions and rules 
directly further presidential policy objectives.304 Scholars have documented 
the limited ability of executive agencies to withstand presidential directives 
as well as the strong removal powers retained by presidents to deal with 
recalcitrant executive agencies, as opposed to independent agencies.305 
Although there is limited delegation to the DOE, as discussed above, 
even more interesting, perhaps, is the fact that Congress has rarely delegated 
any emergency energy authority to FERC. FERC is an independent expert 
energy agency tasked with regulating the bulk of the federal portion of the 
electric grid, with a mission to “[a]ssist consumers in obtaining economically 
 
 301 Congress created a new agency within the Department of Homeland Security to address 
cybersecurity emergencies, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), although its 
role appears to be mainly information-gathering, risk assessment, and coordination, rather than having 
any actual authority to respond to energy emergencies. See CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. 
AGENCY, https://www.dhs.gov/CISA (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). The main responsibilities of CISA 
include: accessing, receiving, and analyzing information on cybersecurity threats; assessing key resource 
and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities; and developing a comprehensive plan to secure key resources 
and critical infrastructure. 6 U.S.C. § 652. 
 302 Federal Authorities, OFF. OF CYBERSECURITY, ENERGY SEC., & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, 
https://www.energy.gov/ceser/activities/energy-security/emergency-preparedness/federal-authorities 
[https://perma.cc/57SZ-HPEV]. 
 303 Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers, 129 YALE L.J. 378, 381 (2019) (“One 
important way in which Congress has designed agencies to resist presidential encroachment is by vesting 
all administrative authority on a given matter in an independent, bipartisan commission.”). 
 304 See infra Section III.C for a discussion of the DOE and FERC’s responses to President Trump’s 
coal-industry bailout plan. 
 305 See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation 
of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1138 (2000) (“The critical element of 
independence is the protection—conferred explicitly by statute or reasonably implied—against removal 
except ‘for cause.’”); see also Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies 
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 769 (2013) (arguing there is “a broad set of indicia 
of independence: removal protection, multimember structure, partisan balance requirements, budget and 
congressional communication authority, litigation authority, and adjudication authority”). 
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efficient, safe, reliable, and secure energy services at a reasonable cost.”306 
FERC is composed of up to five commissioners appointed by the President, 
each serving five-year terms with equal vote on regulatory matters.307 FERC 
also maintains oversight of the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC), the “international regulatory authority whose mission 
is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and 
security of the grid,” and which is responsible for approving and enforcing 
reliability standards.308 While the NERC’s area of responsibility spans 
outside the United States, it has been certified as the nation’s Electric 
Reliability Organization by FERC.309 “No other federal government entity 
[besides FERC] has authority relevant to the day-to-day provision of reliable 
electric service.”310 Despite its energy expertise, the only provision where 
FERC retains emergency energy power relates to hydropower.311 Beyond 
FPA § 202(c)’s initial delegation to FERC, Congress did not contemplate the 
inclusion of FERC in assessing energy emergencies.312 One theory for this 
choice of delegation is the more limited control that the President has over 
 
 306 About FERC, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/what-ferc/overview 
[https://perma.cc/CP4X-TFKV]. 
 307 Meet the Commissioners, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, 
https://www.ferc.gov/about/commission-members [https://perma.cc/748J-TJSW]. 
 308 About NERC, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 
https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7C2A-CPVY]. 
 309 Electric Reliability, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/industries-
data/electric/electric-reliability [https://perma.cc/5YC3-Y6DL]. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
of 2005 gave FERC authority to select a national Electric Reliability Organization. Order Certifying North 
American Reliability Corporation as the Electric Reliability Organization and Ordering Compliance 
Filing, 116 FERC ¶ 61,062 (2006). The Electric Reliability Organization is tasked with developing and 
enforcing standards to ensure the reliability of our nation’s grid. Id. 
 310 JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 4. 
 311 16 U.S.C. § 803(b) (“[E]xcept when emergency shall require for the protection of navigation, life, 
health, or property, no substantial alteration or addition not in conformity with the approved plans shall 
be made to any dam or other project works constructed hereunder of an installed capacity in excess of 
two thousand horsepower without the prior approval of the Commission; and any emergency alteration 
or addition so made shall thereafter be subject to such modification and change as the Commission may 
direct.”). As described in Section II.B.1, even though Congress originally provided FERC with § 202(c) 
emergency authority, Congress later reorganized the provision to delegate this power to the DOE. This 
provision does not appear in our Appendix because the passive voice makes it unclear whether the 
President or the agency has this emergency power. See supra note 107. 
 312 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1379(4) (requiring the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to consult 
with the Secretary of Treasury and report to Congress every two years describing the “implications of the 
technology standard” to confirm identity); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring every federal agency to 
consult with the Secretary of the Interior before taking any action to insure that their actions are “not 
likely to jeopardize . . . endangered species or threatened species”); 49 U.S.C. § 32902(i) (requiring the 
Secretary of Transportation to consult with the Secretary of Energy in prescribing regulations for average 
fuel-economy standards). 
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independent agencies. Scholars have analyzed various aspects of 
independent agencies,313 including FERC,314 suggesting that the President 
would need to exert even more political capital into getting an independent 
agency to do his bidding. As such, the President may have an easier time 
controlling the DOE than FERC. Due to the limited legislative history 
explaining Congress’s choice, it is unclear whether the delegations to the 
DOE are a tacit acquiescence to the President or whether such delegations 
are just a byproduct of historical delegations.315 To include FERC in the 
energy emergency decision-making process, therefore, may enhance the 
legitimacy of the President’s energy emergency actions, without 
jeopardizing her ability to swiftly respond to emergencies.316 
 
 313 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: The Debate over Independent Agencies in Light of 
Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 215 (introducing a symposium titled “The Independence of 
Independent Agencies”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 305, at 780–81 (assessing the President’s power 
over independent agencies); Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as 
Symbol, 47 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1595, 1601 (1997) (describing independent agencies as “somewhat 
less susceptible to direct presidential control than are executive branch agencies”); Strauss & Sunstein, 
supra note 57, at 203 (describing independent agencies as “somewhat remote from presidential 
direction”); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 609 (1989) (noting that “[d]espite the theoretical interest inherent 
in the constitutional issues, no one has comprehensively assessed the impact on [independent] agency 
policymaking of whatever insulation from direct presidential supervision such agencies enjoy”); Peter L. 
Strauss, supra note 37, at 589 (describing the President’s influence as reaching “somewhat more deeply 
into the top layers of bureaucracy at an executive agency than at an independent commission”); Aziz Z. 
Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27–32 (2013) (describing the vast array of 
devices for presidential control of independent agencies). 
 314 Jacobs, supra note 303, at 382; Jason Pinney, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and 
Environmental Justice: Do the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act Offer a Better 
Way?, 30 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 353, 398 (2003) (discussing FERC’s independence generally and 
how it has held on to its autonomy). 
 315 In 2006, when Congress transferred FERC’s FPA powers to the DOE, the sudden change in 
delegation may have reflected the desire of a Republican-controlled Congress to appease the Bush 
Administration. The Bush Administration was known for exercising tight control over agency policy 
decisions. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort 
and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 601 (2010) (reviewing STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE 
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008)). Vice President Dick 
Cheney would often call agencies and persuade them to make a decision that reflected the 
Administration’s policy preferences. Id. Lemos, supra note 30, at 415 (“On its face, that finding might 
seem to call into question the general assumption that agencies are more susceptible to presidential 
influence than are courts. It bears emphasis, however, that the EEOC is an independent agency. 
Independent agencies tend to be governed by a bipartisan commission over which the President has only 
limited removal authority—and, hence, limited means of control.”). 
 316 Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity Policy for the Electricity Sector: The First Step to Protecting Our 
Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 341–43 (2013) (arguing that 
FERC should have emergency powers over cybersecurity); David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and 
Executive Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 795, 797 (2012) (“Cybersecurity has been described as ‘a major 
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B. Accountability: Short-Term vs. Long-Term 
A second justification for unilateral presidential control is 
accountability. But accountability is a loaded term. For instance, Justice 
Kagan, in her discussion of the unitary executive, appeared to focus on the 
electoral process as a check on the President.317 However, there is a large 
body of scholarship that disagrees with Justice Kagan’s assertion that 
presidential authority is more politically accountable than its appointed-
agency counterparts.318 Specifically, critics of this view assert that, in reality, 
the President will not necessarily reflect majoritarian preferences on policy 
issues any more than agency heads.319 
Further, the justification of accountability is undermined when the 
temporal nature of holding a president accountable is considered. If the 
public has to wait for a four-year term to end to hold the President 
accountable, so much time could pass between a disputed presidential action 
and the electoral means to hold that president accountable that it could render 
the cause-and-effect component meaningless. The President is unlikely to be 
 
national security problem for the United States.’” (quoting CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., 
SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 1 (2008))). Notably, this theory may not always play 
out in practice when the majority of the independent FERC commissioners have been appointed by the 
sitting president. President Trump has appointed all four of the current FERC commissioners. Meet the 
Commissioners, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/commission-members 
[https://perma.cc/443M-5QEN]. Recent FERC decisions consistently fall in line with the Trump 
Administration’s policy decisions. See, e.g., Order Issuing Certificate and Approving Abandonment, 
170 FERC ¶ 61,045 (2020); Scott DiSavino, U.S. FERC Sides with PennEast Natgas Pipeline New Jersey 
Eminent Domain Case, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2020, 2:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
penneast-new-jersey/u-s-ferc-sides-with-penneast-natgas-pipeline-new-jersey-eminent-domain-case-
idUSKBN1ZT2VH [https://perma.cc/VLM2-DC52]; see also JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 24–25 
(discussing how a previous DOE employee that worked closely on the DOE’s coal bailout plan was 
nominated and confirmed as a new FERC commissioner and how his “appointment provides DOE with 
an ally in any such proceeding and raises the possibility that FERC itself might raise rates for baseload 
plants through its regulation of RTO market rules”). 
 317 Kagan, supra note 33, at 2331–33. 
 318 See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 54, at 53, 63 (observing that “the critics of strong presidentialism 
may outnumber the proponents” and that “a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political 
control alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic 
policymaking”). 
 319 PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 146, 161 (2009); Kovacs, supra note 55, at 564 (“The fact that the President need not win a 
majority of the vote to be elected (or reelected) further undermines his potential democratic 
accountability.”); Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated 
Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 549, 558 (2018) (noting that 
“[a]ccording to Shane, presidential administration becomes a means to use information control to thwart 
accountability when politically advantageous”); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 49394 (2003) 
(questioning the normative value of majoritarianism). 
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able to connect the causal chain between the prior act and the political 
consequences after an extended period of time, and any ties to the electoral 
result will be confounded by a number of other variables. In this sense, 
unilateral delegations to presidents actually leave them unaccountable in the 
long-term. 
Therefore, our focus should shift to short-term accountability with more 
immediate consequences. This Section demonstrates how incorporating an 
agency in the emergency determination could impact two areas: (1) 
triggering the APA and its accompanying procedural requirements and 
judicial review, which will then assist courts in reviewing (2) the 
interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms. Each of these is discussed 
below. 
1. Administrative Procedure Act Requirements 
The most important way that including an agency in the decision-
making process enhances the short-term accountability is in triggering the 
APA. As discussed above, presidents can avoid the APA, its rulemaking 
requirements, and corresponding judicial review.320 As Justice Kagan has 
noted, “Presidential action occurring under a direct regulation usually is 
insulated from legal challenge, except when the challenge is constitutional 
in nature.”321 Challenges to presidential uses of unilateral emergency 
authority would prove much more difficult against a sitting president, not 
only because of the traditionally strong deference given to presidents in 
national security situations,322 but also because of the strength of executive 
privilege323 and preclusion.324 Furthermore, as discussed above, courts are 
often hesitant to review a president’s actions, particularly where national 
security is concerned.325 
Agencies, on the other hand, are generally bound by procedural rules 
under the APA’s rulemaking and adjudication provisions, which provide 
notice-and-comment opportunities to encourage public engagement in 
agency decision-making, promote agency transparency, and ensure due 
 
 320 See supra Section II.B. 
 321 Kagan, supra note 33, at 2368. 
 322 Stein, supra note 3, at 1219. 
 323 See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1392–93 (1974); see also 
In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“White House produced certain documents but 
withheld others under deliberative process privilege and presidential communications privilege.”). 
 324 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994) (“How the President chooses to exercise the 
discretion Congress has granted him is not a matter for our review.”). 
 325 See supra Part II; Stein, supra note 3, at 1185. 
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process protections in the adjudicative context.326 Critics of unilateral 
presidential delegations also argue that agency rulemaking procedures can 
be more transparent than presidential directives, further enhancing 
accountability.327 Acknowledging that there is less concern when Congress 
delegates to an agency because judicial review is applicable, even Justice 
Kagan admits that “given the difficulty of controlling the exercise of 
discretion delegated to the President . . . rule of law values may counsel extra 
hesitation in allowing the delegation in the first instance.”328 Her view of 
“presidential administration” focuses more on direct delegations to an 
agency and therefore only teeters on the edge of the focus of this Article—
direct delegations to a president. 
The APA also empowers courts to review agency actions. Notably, it 
directs reviewing courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed” and to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions” that violate the law or are otherwise “arbitrary 
[and] capricious.”329 As a Congressional Research Service report explains: 
Pursuant to this mandate, courts are authorized to review agency action in a 
number of contexts. First, courts will examine the statutory authority for an 
agency’s action and will invalidate agency choices that exceed these limits. In 
addition, a court may examine an agency’s discretionary decisions, or discrete 
actions with legal consequences for the public. Finally, courts may also review 
 
 326 5 U.S.C. § 553 (rulemaking); id. § 554 (adjudication). But see sources cited supra note 68. 
 327 Mashaw & Berke, supra note 319, at 611 (“[T]o the degree that administration action is motivated 
by political considerations emanating from the White House, there is a necessary loss of transparency 
compared with agency action carried out through normal administrative procedures.”); id. at 612 
(“Presidential administration tends by its very nature to limit the actors who are engaged in policy 
discussions and conceal the real motivations and considerations behind the administrative policies.”); id. 
(“Agency rulemaking processes are arguably the most open and deliberative of any processes in American 
federal governance. And to that degree, presidential administration is antithetical to . . . democratic 
accountability . . . .”); Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 896 (2017) (“A 
problem inside the executive, however, is that legal understandings can change in secret—through 
unpublished, sometimes close-hold decisions that prevent public notice or democratic feedback as to 
those altered understandings.”); Watts, supra note 41, at 686 (“Yet other tools [of presidential control], 
including more veiled OMB review and behind-closed-door communications, may undermine 
transparency and the rule of law, taint agency science, and cast doubt on the legitimacy of agencies’ 
decisions.”). 
 328 Kagan, supra note 33, at 2369 (citing Ethyl Corp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
1976)). 
 329 5 U.S.C. § 706; see JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44699.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y74H-KQQX]. 
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an agency’s compliance with statutory procedural requirements, such as the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures imposed by the APA.330 
Opponents seeking to challenge agency actions face potential 
roadblocks related to preclusion, jurisdiction, standing, exhaustion, and 
ripeness, which slow the decision-making process for apt judicial 
deliberation.331 But at least they have a valid basis for judicial review. 
When the DOE issues emergency orders under FPA § 202(c), for 
instance, it provides a basis for judicial review of the DOE’s “justifications 
for intervention.”332 FPA § 313(b) provides for judicial review333 and 
opponents would likely be able to seek relief under traditional rules.334 As 
just one example, the parties to the FPA § 202(c) emergency mandated 
electricity sales were denied a FERC refund due to the compulsory nature of 
the sales.335 These parties challenged the methods and information FERC 
used to determine what satisfies a § 202(c) exemption.336 Despite the 
difficulties in suing agencies, they pale in comparison to the challenges 
associated with challenging presidential emergency energy findings.337 As 
such, application of the APA therefore has the potential to enhance both 
procedural rigor and strengthen judicial review of emergency 
determinations. 
 
 330 COLE, supra note 329, at Summary. 
 331 Richard L. Hughes, Roadblocks to Judicial Review of Department of Energy and Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission Administrative Actions, 22 TULSA L. REV. 601, 601 (1986). 
 332 JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 11. 
 333 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b); Hughes, supra note 331, at 603 (“The legislative history of the DOE 
Organization Act provides expressly for judicial review through ‘Title V—Administrative Procedures 
and Judicial Review.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-164, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 854, 897–900)); 16 U.S.C. § 823a(d)(B). 
 334 See, e.g., Hunter v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 527 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2007) (“The four 
factors which courts in this Circuit consider when determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to injunctive 
relief are whether: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits of its 
claims; (2) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if the defendants are not enjoined; (3) an injunction 
would not substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) the public interest favors issuing an 
injunction.”). 
 335 Pub. Utils. Comm’n of the State of Cal. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 462 F.3d 1027, 1065 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
 336 See id. at 1064–65 (granting motion to strike with respect to § 202(c) transactions); see also PPL 
Wallingford Energy LLC v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 419 F.3d 1194, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (vacating 
and remanding orders made by FERC that rejected power companies’ agreement to provide electric power 
with ISO New England on a cost-of-service basis). 
 337 Stein, supra note 3, at 1203–18. 
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2. Ambiguous Statutory Terms 
As discussed in my prior work, this short-term accountability is even 
more necessary when statutory terms are not well defined. This can lead to a 
troublesome ripple effect, where a president can take liberties to interpret 
undefined terms in a way that is favorable to her purpose and not easily 
subject to dispute, which can lead to a court reviewing a president’s statutory 
interpretation with uncertain deference.338 As such, one ambiguous term can 
destabilize an entire statutory purpose. Many of the statutes, including the 
NGA, the DPA, and the Atomic Energy Act, fail to include any definition of 
what constitutes an energy emergency to unlock a president’s powers. Even 
where Congress does include a relevant definition, many of the embedded 
emergency terms are often left undefined. Even though the FPA defines a 
“grid security emergency,”339 for instance, there is still much ambiguity 
within the definition. What does it mean to be “imminent”? What are 
“significant adverse effects on reliability”?340 This suggests that accidental 
grid emergencies would not trigger this authority. What about a 
cybersecurity attack? That does not appear to satisfy the “direct physical 
attack,” but could it be regarded as a “malicious act using electronic 
communication”?341 Or does it fall through the cracks of the FPA? 
Similarly, the EPCA provides a definition of a “severe energy supply 
interruption” and conditions many emergency powers on the President 
determining that the definition is satisfied.342 But at what threshold can a 
president determine that there is a “national energy supply shortage,” what 
is a “significant” scope and duration, and what are “adverse impacts”?343 We 
are no strangers to undefined terms in statutes, but the stakes are quite high 
where the meaning of the term is not about the scope of regulation, but about 
the power to shut down an entire industry or facility. 
The definitional ambiguity might be justified by the benefits of 
flexibility; however, these potential benefits also come with attendant costs, 
including uncertain deference provided to a statutory president.344 As just one 
example, the Trump Administration has also attempted to stretch the concept 
 
 338 Id. 
 339 See supra notes 201–202. 
 340 Federal Power Act § 215A (as amended), 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(a)(7)(B). 
 341 16 U.S.C. § 824o-1(a)(7). 
 342 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 8511 (conservation targets); id. § 8374(a) (coal allocation); id. § 8374(b) 
(natural gas or petroleum prohibitions). 
 343 Id. § 6202(8). 
 344 See Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 267, 299–300. 
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of an energy emergency to bail out a failing coal industry.345 What is to stop 
presidents from continuing to expand the definition of an energy emergency 
to unlock statutory powers for nonemergency purposes? Could climate 
change qualify as an energy emergency?346 
As such, even those who argue for the benefits of broad and vague 
powers in a time of crisis contemplate adding useful limiting criteria.347 The 
problem of undefined statutory terms left to be interpreted by a president is 
even more troublesome when one understands the dearth of clarity on 
judicial review of such presidential statutory interpretations. As Professor 
Stack and I separately address elsewhere, there is a lack of judicial consensus 
on the standard of review to apply to such situations.348 In short, by providing 
more clarity in the relevant terms, Congress would constrain the amount of 
discretion that the President would have to interpret the term however they 
see fit. Accordingly, more concrete definition and prescriptive preconditions 
that must be satisfied prior to unlocking such powers could enhance short-
term accountability by bolstering the judiciary’s ability to review the 
President’s actions. 
C. Consistency: An Executive Divided 
As a starting place, it is not clear how important policy consistency 
actually is for emergencies. In fact, emergencies are often the place where 
there is deviation from the norm—special circumstances justify special 
accommodations. But perhaps even more important is the unappreciated 
benefit that can come from inconsistency. In this sense, there are benefits of 
 
 345 Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940 (proposed Sept. 29, 2017) (to be codified at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
 346 Dan Farber, Using Emergency Powers to Fight Climate Change, LEGAL PLANET (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://legal-planet.org/2019/01/14/using-emergency-powers-to-fight-climate-change/ 
[https://perma.cc/PEW4-ZYDS]; Ball, supra note 66, at 923 (concluding that “our constitutional 
structure, especially with a view toward legal and structural stability, necessitates that this [climate-
change emergency] power belongs to the President or Congress, and not the executive agencies”). But 
see John Schwartz & Tik Root, Could a Future President Declare a Climate Emergency?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/16/climate/climate-national-emergency-hot-
water.html [https://perma.cc/Y7C5-ADHS] (noting that most emergency powers “cut the other way” and 
would be unsuitable for climate change because they “allow the president to temporarily suspend 
environmental protections . . . [as] in the case of a national emergency that requires a quick surge in 
energy production”). 
 347 PAUL N. STOCKTON, RESILIENCE FOR GRID SECURITY EMERGENCIES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
INDUSTRY–GOVERNMENT COLLABORATION 20 (2018), 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1059491.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XAV-TH9P] (arguing that both 
the imminence of an attack and the potential consequences of the attack should be two criteria the 
President considers before declaring a “grid security emergency”). 
 348 See Stein, supra note 3, at 1203–04; Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 299–300. 
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disagreement between the President and an agency, as the resulting friction 
can sometimes result in an agency changing a president’s mind. Even though 
many of the disagreements between a president and her agencies often 
remain internal and confidential to the administration, there are a number of 
instances where agencies have publicly disagreed with a president. In 2005, 
Assistant Federal Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner Susan F. 
Wood resigned in protest of the FDA’s decision to delay final ruling on over-
the-counter accessibility of the morning-after pill.349 In another instance, 
former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that he had to disagree with 
President Trump repeatedly and tell him that his actions violated the law.350 
Additionally, former Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen 
disagreed with President Trump when he asked her to close the southern 
border.351 Most recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic, President Trump’s 
scientific advisors have diplomatically, yet repeatedly, contradicted the 
President during publicly televised official White House briefings.352 
In some of these examples, the agencies caved to presidential 
pressure.353 In others, the agency actors appear to have convinced the 
 
 349 Marc Kaufman, FDA Official Quits over Delay on Plan B, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/31/AR2005083101271.html 
[https://perma.cc/N78S-XY5C]. 
 350 Caitlin Oprysko, ‘It Violates the Law’: Tillerson Vents About Having to Repeatedly Push Back 
Against Trump, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2018, 9:28 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/07/tillerson-
spills-on-trump-1048884 [https://perma.cc/PTZ3-N69C]. 
 351 Stephen Collinson, DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen’s Ouster Exposes Trump’s Immigration 
Crisis, CNN (Apr. 8, 2019, 9:45 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/08/politics/donald-trump-kirstjen-
nielsen-immigration/index.html [https://perma.cc/J3NE-NUBW]. Additional cases of disagreement with 
President Trump include White House counsel Don McGahn refusing to fire Robert Mueller in 2017, 
Grace Segers, McGahn, Wary of “Saturday Night Massacre,” Refused Trump Order to Fire Mueller, 
CBS NEWS (Apr. 18, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mueller-report-white-house-
counsel-don-mcgahn-refused-trump-order-to-fire-mueller-wary-of-saturday-night-massacre/ 
[https://perma.cc/VGC6-PB85], and disagreement by ICE on President Trump’s proposal to take 
apprehended migrants crossing the border to sanctuary cities, Rachael Bade & Nick Miroff, White House 
Proposed Releasing Immigrant Detainees in Sanctuary Cities, Targeting Political Foes, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 11, 2019, 10:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/white-house-proposed-
releasing-immigrant-detainees-in-sanctuary-cities-targeting-political-foes/2019/04/11/72839bc8-5c68-
11e9-9625-01d48d50ef75_story.html?utm_term=.37f53a02f44e [https://perma.cc/8CH4-4YPY]. 
 352 See, e.g., Libby Cathey, Trump Versus the Doctors: When the President and His Experts 
Contradict Each Other, ABC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2020, 6:55 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-
versus-doctors-president-experts-contradict/story?id=70330642 [https://perma.cc/5RQ3-AFMV] 
(detailing transcript contradictions between the President and his top infectious-disease experts on testing 
capacity, virus resurgence, and treatments using hydroxychloroquine and household disinfectants). 
 353 Secretary of Defense Mattis signed an order to remove troops from Syria despite disagreeing. He 
later resigned because of a difference in views. Nancy A. Youssef & Gordon Lubold, Mattis, Blindsided 
by Trump’s Syria Decision, Resigned Days Later, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2018, 9:38 PM), 
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President to abandon his initial push. For example, the EPA Deputy 
Administrator during the Nixon Administration reported that he was called 
to the White House in an effort to drop an enforcement action against a 
company which had supported President Nixon in the election.354 The 
incident was leaked, and after congressional hearings, the White House 
backed off and the EPA Administrator, William Ruckelshaus, said he would 
resign if EPA decisions were overruled due to political considerations.355 
Similarly, during the George W. Bush Administration, large numbers of 
legal officials in the CIA, FBI, and Justice Department threatened to resign, 
forcing the Administration to make significant changes to its surveillance 
program.356 
Another recent example of agency resistance can be found in President 
Trump’s efforts to bail out the failing coal industry. After pressure from coal-
industry CEOs to invoke FPA § 202(c),357 President Trump directed his 
Energy Secretary to use his authority to pressure FERC to bail out the failing 
coal industry;358 the DOE complied with the President’s request by issuing a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for a market rule relying on FPA §§ 205 and 
206 and submitting its request to FERC.359 However, FERC resisted, 
providing an example of both an executive agency’s acquiescence (the DOE) 
and an independent agency’s resistance to a president’s desires (FERC).360 In 
response, coal CEOs again pushed the President and DOE to invoke § 202(c) 




 354 Percival, supra note 39, at 2498. 
 355 Id. 
 356 Id. at 2524–28. 
 357 JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 21–22. 
 358 Id. at 1617. 
 359 Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,940, 46,941 (proposed Sept. 29, 2017) (to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
 360 Memorandum from FERC (May 29, 2018), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4491203-Grid-Memo.html [https://perma.cc/R63D-ELLF]. 
 361 Statement from the Press Secretary on Fuel-Secure Power Facilities, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 
1, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-fuel-secure-
power-facilities/ [https://perma.cc/3KE5-S8NX]; see Letter from Rick C. Giannantonio, Gen. Couns., 
FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., to James Richard Perry, Sec’y of Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy 31 (Mar. 29, 
2018), https://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/fes-202c-application.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KC9W-X6M5] (requesting invocation of FPA § 202(c) and an emergency order 
“directing (i) the subject baseload nuclear and coal-fired generators to enter into contracts . . . with 
PJM . . . to generate, deliver, interchange, and transmit electric energy, capacity, and ancillary 
services . . . and (ii) PJM to pay . . . reasonable cost-based rates that provide for full cost recovery 
consistent with ratemaking standards and principles or as otherwise necessary to ensure continued 
operations”). 
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resulting in a leaked DOE proposal that would have relied on FPA § 202(c) 
and the DPA.362 As a result of FERC’s strong opposition to the bailout plan 
and the potential use of FPA § 202(c) and the DPA, neither were invoked.363 
Had there been no independent agency involvement, President Trump could 
have made the unilateral decision to implement this bailout. 
Further, this was not the first time that FERC tempered an overzealous 
request to invoke FPA § 202(c) authority. In 1973, Arab members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an oil 
embargo against the United States in retaliation for the U.S. decision to 
resupply the Israeli military.364 The oil embargo placed immense pressure on 
oil supplies, and local utilities requested the Federal Power Commission 
(FPC) (FERC’s predecessor) to issue an FPA § 202(c) order to facilitate 
cooperation between domestic oil companies.365 The FPC rejected the 
§ 202(c) request, finding the agency was already able to facilitate successful 
cooperation without declaring an emergency.366 Although the agency was not 
tempering a request from the President, it does show the power of the agency 
to withstand pressure. 
These examples of agencies flexing their muscles against a strong 
president can be countered by the numerous times that agency officials have 
been removed for failing to fall in line with a president’s preferences. 
President Trump alone has removed numerous high-profile officials for 
registering disagreement.367 Although theses removals have other deleterious 
effects on the healthy functioning of an administration, they also have 
important signaling effects to the public on the degree to which a president’s 
actions may be out of line with other informed experts and demonstrate the 
potential benefit of agency involvement in former unilateral presidential 
decisions.368 
 
 362 See JACOBS & PESKOE, supra note 8, at 23. 
 363 Jeff St. John, FERC Commissioners Agree: No Grid Emergency Exists to Justify Coal, Nuclear 
Bailout, GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 12, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ferc-
commissioners-agree-no-grid-emergency-exists#gs.uAKGntk [https://perma.cc/9GCQ-25GD]. 
 364 New Eng. Power Pool Participants, 54 F.P.C. 1375, 1375–76 (1975). 
 365 Id. 
 366 Id. at 1375. The D.C. Circuit later affirmed the Commission’s decision to decline to exercise its 
emergency powers. Richmond Power & Light v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 574 F.2d 610, 614 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). 
 367 Jan Diehm, Sam Petulla & Zachary B. Wolf, Who Has Left Trump’s Administration and Orbit?, 
CNN (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/08/politics/trump-admin-departures-trnd/ 
[https://perma.cc/R95J-SUNE]. 
 368 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 313, at 4; Patricia L. Bellia, PCAOB and the Persistence of the Removal 
Puzzle, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1371 (2012). 
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D. Expediency: Benefits of Bureaucracy 
The last justification for unilateral delegation is expediency. The 
bureaucracy generated by including an agency in the decision-making 
process is often viewed as a negative.369 But delegating to an agency also 
creates a buffer between a crisis and an overzealous president. For those who 
believe agencies are merely pawns of the President, this additional layer of 
authority should have minimal impact. But for those who believe that 
agencies can resist the President, the impact would only make a difference 
where perhaps it should. In most times of emergency, there should be no 
disagreement between the energy agencies and the President. But where 
agencies (especially those beholden to the President) and the President 
disagree, this disagreement should raise red flags and perhaps the resulting 
delay is necessary and beneficial. 
This Section encourages a contrarian view of agency bureaucracy as a 
positive internal check on a president. Other scholars have had a similar 
response to the inclusion of agencies in statutory delegations. Professor 
Stack has spent the last decade expertly exploring the nuances of the 
“statutory President,” focusing on complicated and necessary questions of 
deference, reviewability, and contingent delegations.370 As part of this work, 
he argues that delegation to an agency, as opposed to the President, “creates 
a check on the President’s claims of authority internal to the executive 
branch.”371 
Gillian Metzger argued recently that the fundamental features of the 
administrative state—“bureaucratic oversight, expertise, professionalism, 
structural insulation, procedural requirements, and the like . . . hold[] the key to 
securing accountable, constrained, and effective exercises of executive 
power.” In particular, the structure of the federal bureaucracy helps to “forestall 
presidential aggrandizement.”372 
These arguments suggest that the bureaucratic burdens of agency 
involvement are worth the cost, but they acknowledge that payment will still 
be due. Involving agencies in these emergency decisions will necessarily 
 
 369 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 846–47 (2014). 
 370 Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 1013–14 
(2007); Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 304–10; Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the 
President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1172–73 (2009); Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory 
President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 553 (2005) (“The only potential constitutional source of procedural 
constraint on presidential orders is the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”). 
 371 Stack, supra note 112, at 10. 
 372 Kovacs, supra note 55, at 559 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The 
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 78 (2017)). 
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increase the transaction costs by including more people in the decision-
making process, triggering procedural requirements with which the agency 
must comply, and increasing the amount of time that may be required to 
reach a consensus. 
To mitigate these bureaucratic costs, Congress could structure the 
relationship between the President and the agency more thoughtfully. For 
instance, as I have argued elsewhere, Congress could subject the agency to 
differing degrees of scrutiny, depending on the type of emergency being 
faced.373 I proposed a sliding scale for different types of emergencies, from 
acute (discrete, specific incidents capable of identification) to chronic 
(generalized threats with indistinct beginnings and ends or those recognized 
as perpetual) emergencies, with corresponding procedural requirements.374 
This idea is not entirely new. Section 3 of the Energy Emergency 
Preparedness Act of 1982 (EEPA) also adopted a sliding scale for triggering 
presidential authority. It divides “the threshold standards for activation of the 
President’s statutory authorities”375 into three categories: “(i) situations 
involving limited or general war, international tensions that threaten national 
security, and other Presidentially declared emergencies; (ii) events resulting 
in activation of the international energy program; and (iii) events or 
situations less severe than those described in clauses (i) and (ii).”376 Where 
energy emergencies are not acute, Congress can require the President to 
document the justifications for unlocking these powers.377 Professor Kathryn 
Watts and I have both argued for application of administrative law doctrines 
to help enhance accountability and control over unbridled executive 
authority.378 While she focused on tools to enhance transparency and 
 
 373 Stein, supra note 3, at 125256. 
 374 Id. at 1253. 
 375 Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Counsel, to the 
President on Legal Authorities Available to the President to Respond to a Severe Energy Supply 
Interruption or Other Substantial Reduction in Available Petroleum Products 648 (Nov. 15, 1982), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/23221/download [https://perma.cc/5T8W-TLSW]. 
 376 Energy Emergency Preparedness Act of 1982 § 272(a)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6282, repealed by Act 
of Nov. 9, 2000, Pub. L. 106-469, §104, 114 Stat. 2029, 2033. 
 377 See Stein, supra note 3, at 1252–56. For example, immigration has been a chronic problem and 
yet President Trump was able to invoke emergency powers without complying with any procedural 
prerequisites. See supra note 8. Under my proposed approach, during chronic emergencies like 
immigration, Congress would require the President to document why immigration is an emergency and 
why addressing it requires the use of emergency powers. See Stein, supra note 3, at 1253. 
 378 See id. at 1245–52; Stack, Statutory Powers, supra note 36, at 299–300; Kovacs, supra note 55, 
at 563 (agreeing with Peter Shane “that presidential administration ‘breeds an insularity, defensiveness, 
and even arrogance within the executive branch that undermines sound decision making, discounts the 
rule of law, and attenuates the role of authentic deliberation in shaping political outcomes’” (quoting 
SHANE, supra note 319, at 25)). 
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process,379 I focused on procedural constraints to augment the record for 
judicial review.380 
There are already a number of examples where Congress requires an 
agency to make factual findings before unlocking environmental emergency 
powers. For instance, in evaluating the Occupational Safety and Health 
Agency (OSHA)’s use of emergency authority, Congress required that 
OSHA must first make two explicit findings. OSHA must find not only a 
danger of exposure or even some danger from exposure, but also a grave 
danger from exposure necessitating emergency action.381 Similarly, to issue 
an emergency regulation under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the EPA 
must publish in the Federal Register “detailed reasons why such regulation 
is necessary” and give actual notice to appropriate state agencies of the 
regulation.382 To issue an emergency standard under The Mine and Safety 
Act, the Secretary of Labor must determine “that miners are exposed to grave 
danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or 
physically harmful, or to other hazards, and . . . that such emergency 
standard is necessary to protect miners from such danger.”383 And before the 
EPA can unlock its SDWA emergency authority, it “must explain and 
document, as necessary, why the ordered action is needed even if state or 
local governments may have taken or are taking actions to protect public 
health,” and the EPA region must consult with The Office of Enforcement 
and Compliance Assurance.384 
Just as Congress often requires that agencies make specific findings that 
must be satisfied prior to unlocking emergency powers, presidents too should 
be required to make specific findings where time and circumstances allow it. 
Courts have argued that even imminent hazards should be subject to judicial 
review to ensure that “the emergency action was [not] taken without 
adequate determining principle or was unreasoned.”385 However, imposing 
factual finding requirements on a president during a crisis may not sit well 
with many. And it may not always alter the substantive outcome.386 It is 
 
 379 Watts, supra note 41, at 683. 
 380 Stein, supra note 3, at 1229. 
 381 Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 489 F.2d 120, 130 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 382 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7). 
 383 Int’l Union v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 823 F.2d 608, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting 
30 U.S.C. § 811(b)). 
 384 Kelley & Leff, supra note 68. 
 385 Nor-Am Agric. Prods., Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151, 1165 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 386 See High Country Conservation Advocs. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1181 (D. 
Colo. 2014) (“The National Environmental Policy Act is one of our country’s foundational environmental 
statutes. The law, however, does not prescribe any substantive environmental standards per se. Rather 
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possible, for instance, that a president faced with documenting her reasons 
for invoking emergency authority may merely check the boxes facially 
without actually documenting her true reasoning. But in certain 
circumstances, the findings may play an important role in subsequent judicial 
review.387 By providing a written record with justifications for invoking the 
emergency power, a president would not only enhance transparency with the 
public, but may provide a court with a record for review.388 And it may be 
these actions on the margins that are a step in the right direction to help guide 
a president towards the proper outcome. 
Furthermore, mere involvement of an agency does not necessarily mean 
a slower response. In fact, in situations where Congress has provided both 
the President and an agency head with emergency powers, the agency is 
sometimes the more responsive and more expedient delegate. In both the 
H1N1 and COVID-19 pandemics, for instance, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services declared a public-health emergency long before the 
presidents declared a “national emergency.”389 
Courts have also recognized the need for agencies to act swiftly in 
response to an emergency, noting the need to “ensure that the [EPA’s] power 
under the Act remains ‘relatively untrammeled’” so “that [the] EPA can act 
promptly and effectively when a threat to public health is imminent.”390 
 
NEPA is a procedural statute designed to ensure public participation and transparent decision-making by 
federal agencies.”); Citizens for Smart Growth v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Transp., 669 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (“The requirements of NEPA are purely procedural and do not mandate any specific outcome; 
agencies may make a decision that preferences other factors over environmental concerns as long as they 
have first adequately identified and analyzed the environmental impacts.”). 
 387 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–24 (2018). 
 388 See supra note 88 for examples where Congress imposed such procedural requirements on a 
president.  
 389 See Proclamation Concerning the Novel Coronavirus, supra note 69 (stating that the virus was 
first discovered in China in December 2019, on January 31 the Secretary declared a public-health 
emergency, and on March 13 the President declared a national emergency). The delay between the first 
COVID-19 case reported in the United States and the President’s response was about six weeks. For 
H1N1, the delay was almost six months. Angelo Fichera, Flawed Comparison on Coronavirus, H1N1 
Emergency Timelines, FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.factcheck.org/2020/03/flawed-
comparison-on-coronavirus-h1n1-emergency-timelines/ [https://perma.cc/9VM6-F8K6]; see also Eric 
Lipton, David E. Sanger, Maggie Haberman, Michael D. Shear, Mark Mazzetti & Julian E. Barnes, He 
Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-response.html 
[https://perma.cc/8NBC-3V4D]. 
 390 Trinity Am. Corp. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 150 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing a 1974 
House report describing Congress’s intention that the EPA Administrator retain broad 
emergency powers); see Eric Moorman, “A Greater Sense of Urgency”: EPA’s Emergency Authority 
Under the SDWA and Lessons from Flint, Michigan, 47 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10786, 10787–
88 (2017) (citing Trinity, 150 F.3d 389); W.R. Grace & Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 261 F.3d 330, 339 (3d Cir. 
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Congress has done the same, often waiving rulemaking procedures for 
agencies when delegating emergency powers to mimic the expedited process 
that exists for the President. A number of these examples are below: 
 The Endangered Species Act (ESA) provides that if there exists 
an “emergency posing a significant risk to the well-being of any 
species of fish or wildlife or plants,” the Secretary is given the 
authority under the ESA to bypass ESA and APA rulemaking 
procedures and issue immediate regulations.391 
 The Mine Act allows the Secretary of Labor to issue emergency 
health and safety standards “without regard to the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”392 
 The EPCA waives the thirty-day comment period for any 
proposed rule or regulation where the President finds that such 
waiver is necessary to act expeditiously during an emergency 
affecting the national security of the United States.393 
 The Disaster Relief Act waives the requirements of the APA 
where the President commands the Administrator of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to establish a 
threshold for eligibility for disaster relief,394 and the FEMA 
Administrator may waive notice-and-comment rulemaking for 
establishing criteria for the approval of applications for hazard-
mitigation assistance.395 
 
In a similar way, by using acute and chronic distinctions, Congress 
would be able to maintain the same level of responsiveness when the 
emergency is deserving of the expedience of unilateral presidential action, 
but would be able to demand more of a president where the emergency is 
chronic and loosely defined. In summary, this last Part demonstrates how the 
theorized justifications for unilateral presidential control actually support the 
involvement of expert energy agencies in emergency energy determinations. 
 
2001) (“Thus, it is well established from the legislative history and case law that SDWA confers on the 
EPA broad authority to address present and future harm that may substantially threaten the health of 
persons who use public water systems.”). 
 391 Environmental Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7). In such a case, the listing only lasts 
240 days and expires if the agency does not adopt a final rule using standard rulemaking procedures. Id. 
 392 Int’l Union v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 823 F.2d 608, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing 30 U.S.C. 
§ 811(b)). 
 393 42 U.S.C. § 6393(a)(2)(A). 
 394 Id. § 5189(b)(2) (“[T]he President shall direct the Administrator to . . . immediately establish a 
threshold for eligibility [for disaster relief] under this section in an appropriate amount, without regard to 
chapter 5 of title 5.”). 
 395 Id. § 5170c. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article embarked on a journey to explore the President’s authority 
to act in times of an energy emergency. In evaluating a number of statutory 
provisions regarding energy security, a disturbing pattern emerges. These 
provisions paint a picture of the President empowered to operate without 
meaningful oversight, guidance, judicial review, or counsel by her agency 
experts. The amorphous nature of emergencies, the lack of energy expertise 
unique to the President, and the potential for abuse of these powers suggest 
that Congress should more sparingly delegate emergency energy powers 
directly to the President. 
Using statutory energy emergencies, this Article demonstrates that the 
nation would be better served by including expert energy agencies in these 
decisions, and that expertise, accountability, consistency, and expediency 
can be achieved without fostering unilateral presidential power. Despite 
unitary-theory contentions that delegations to executive agencies are 
irrelevant to the President’s exercise of power, this Article demonstrates how 
a shared delegation to the President and an expert agency can result in better 
decision-making, particularly in an area such as energy with both executive 
(the Department of Energy) and independent (the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission) agencies at the President’s disposal. A technical and 
complicated sector such as energy deserves to have expert agencies involved 
in critical emergency decisions, which can be done without unduly hindering 
the President’s ability to act swiftly in times of emergency. 
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